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Abstract
The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence
that the pre-analytic notion being explicated is too vague to be useful. I show instead
that a significant number of these criteria—by Ayer, Popper, Przełe˛cki, Suppes, and
David Lewis, among others—not only form a coherent whole, but also connect directly
to the theory of definition, the notion of empirical content as explicated by Ramsey
sentences, and the theory of measurement; two criteria by Carnap and Sober are
trivial, but can be saved and connected to the other criteria by slight modifications. A
corollary is that the ordinary language defense of Lewis, the conceptual arguments
by Ayer and Popper, the theoretical considerations by Przełe˛cki, and the practical
considerations by Suppes all apply to the same criterion or closely related criteria.
Furthermore, the equivalence of some criteria allows for their individual justifications
to be taken cumulatively and, together with the entailment relations between non-
equivalent criteria, suggest criteria for general auxiliary assumptions, comparative
criteria, and more liberal conceptions of observation.
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1 Introduction
Criteria of empirical significance are meant to demarcate those statements or terms that
have some connection to empirical statements from those that do not. An early criterion
suggested by Ayer (1936, 38f) was quickly shown to be trivial; it was followed by a slew
of amendments and new trivialization proofs succinctly summarized and extended by
Pokriefka (1983), who cuts out the middleman and proves the triviality of his amendment
himself (Pokriefka 1984). The latest contributions to this “puncture-and-patch industry”
(Lewis 1988a, §XII) are two criteria by Wright (1986, 1989) and trivialization proofs by
Lewis (1988a, §IV, n. 12), Wright (1989, §II), and Yi (2001).
This history has “done a lot to discredit the very idea of delineating a class of statements
as empirical” (Lewis 1988a, §I), but does not show that all suggested criteria are trivial.
Still, non-trivial criteria could be charged with arbitrariness, as Lewis (1988a, 127, footnote
removed) does when he notes that the amendments of Ayer’s criterion
have led to ever-increasing complexity and ever-diminishing contact with any
intuitive idea of what it means for a statement to be empirical. Even if some
page-long descendant of Ayer’s criterion [provably admitted] more than the
observation-statements and less than all the statements, we would be none the
wiser. We do not want just any class of statements that is intermediate between
clearly too little and clearly too much. We want the right class.
This also holds for criteria that do not amend Ayer’s criterion. Their multitude suggests
that they are little more than arbitrary bipartitions of statements.
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One goal of this article is to show that this charge of arbitrariness is unfounded, for
many of the non-trivial criteria are equivalent or bear strong inferential relations to each
other and to concepts from definition and measurement theory. Among the criteria are
falsifiability and verifiability, but also more contemporary suggestions, the most recent
being by Sober (2008). I will argue that there are essentially four major non-trivial criteria
of empirical significance that stand in simple entailment relations to each other.
This is already a good reason to look more closely at the non-trivial criteria of empirical
significance, but there are others. For one, many criticisms of the criteria have seen
rebuttals (reviewed in §2), mostly because they rely on misunderstandings of the criteria’s
intended applications. But there is also still a need for criteria of empirical significance.
Sometimes a criterion is needed to state very clearly what is not generally under dispute,
as in Sober’s discussions of the empirical significance of claims about a designer of life
whose intentions and abilities are unknown (Sober 1999, 2007, 2008). In other cases, a
generally accepted endeavor is put under scrutiny, like string theory (Smolin 2006, Woit
2006), fish stock assessment theories (Corkett 2002), or natural selection (Wassermann
1978). The empirical significance of more philosophical positions like theism (Diamond
and Litzenburg 1975) or realism and antirealism (Sober 1990) have also been investigated.
In the remainder of this article, I will discuss several criteria of empirical significance
that turn out to be equivalent (§3.1) or nearly equivalent (§3.2) to falsifiability, and I will
briefly describe verifiability (§4). Falsifiability and verifiability are more inclusive than the
(universally panned) criterion demanding both (§5), which itself is more inclusive than
the criterion of strong O -determinacy, suggested independently by Patrick Suppes, Marian
Przełe˛cki, and David Lewis (§6). More inclusive than both falsifiability and verifiability is
the criterion that demands either one, and which has been suggested by David Rynin in a
syntactic and by Przełe˛cki in a semantic formulation. A criterion given by Carnap, once it is
modified to avoid triviality, is a variant of this (§7). Falsifiability, verifiability, their disjunc-
tion, and strong O -creativity thus make up the four major criteria of empirical significance.
The entailment relations between them suggest the introduction of comparative concepts of
empirical significance (§8.1). And since the different formulations of each major criterion
have been arrived at by different considerations, their equivalence justifies a re-evaluation
of their statuses (§8.2). The equivalences of the different formulations also allow to choose
based on expedience which formulation to generalize. I suggest two generalizations, one of
them weakening the assumptions about observations (§9.1). And modifying an otherwise
trivial criterion by Elliott Sober leads to a generalization of falsifiability that takes general
background assumptions into account. This generalization transfers directly to all other
criteria (§9.2). In the end, these results will provide evidence that the search for criteria of
empirical equivalence has been successful.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Methodological presumptions
The development of a criterion of empirical significance out of the vague and intuitive
concept variously described as ‘having empirical content’, ‘being connected to observations’,
‘being testable’, and ‘being empirically meaningful’ amounts to an explication (cf. Kuipers
2007). According to Carnap (1950, 7), the criterion of empirical significance (the explica-
tum) should be similar to the intuitive concept (the explicandum), and furthermore precise,
fruitful, and as simple as possible given the preceding desiderata.
Carnap explicates ‘fruitful’ as ‘useful for the formulation of many universal statements’,
but this suggests that fruitfulness can be determined by counting sentences with univer-
sal quantifiers. The underlying idea has been put better by Hempel (1952, 663), who
demands, with reference to Carnap, that “it should be possible to develop, in terms of
the reconstructed concepts, a comprehensive [ . . . ] and sound theoretical system”. This
suggests that the explicatum should connect in simple ways to concepts related to the
explicandum, which, in the case of empirical significance, could be the notions of empirical
content, confirmation, and measurement, for instance. To demand specific connections
would lead to precise conditions of adequacy for the explicatum (cf. Tarski 1944, §4), but
their discussion would take me too far. Explicata are correct or incorrect only relative to the
conditions of adequacy, which are pragmatically chosen based on the intended application
of the explicatum. Thus explications are not true or false claims, but more or less expedient
suggestions (Popper 1935, 37f; Hempel 1952, 663)
Concepts are typically explicated in a restricted domain. For instance, Tarski restricted
himself to predicate logic when explicating ‘truth’, as did Carnap when explicating ‘analytic’.
Such a restriction is acceptable and indeed almost always necessary to attain any results at
all (Martin 1952). It is therefore not a fundamental problem that the explicata discussed
in the following assume a language of first or higher order predicate logic. Rather, the
explicata should be seen as first steps towards the development of more general criteria. In
other words, the criteria define empirical significance on the condition that the language is
one of predicate logic. Especially opponents of the syntactic view on theories will consider
this an extreme restriction. It is part of philosophical folklore that the syntactic view failed
because of its reliance on predicate logic, and has now been completely superseded by the
semantic view, which relies only on set- or model theory. This is less of a problem than
it might seem, for, first, the equivalences discussed here will in fact suggest immediate
generalizations beyond predicate logic. Second, not all major criticisms of the syntactic
view are in fact justified (Lutz 2010a). Third, it is doubtful that the use of (higher order)
predicate logic poses more restrictions on the formalization of theories than the use of
set- or model theory (Lutz 2010c). In fact, in the following I will discuss syntactic, model
theoretic, and set theoretic criteria of empirical significance and the conditions under which
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they are equivalent.
More problematic than the use of predicate logic is that some of the criteria discussed
in the following (the semantic ones, by the way) assume a bipartition of the non-logical
vocabulary V of the language into observational terms O and theoretical terms T , with
sentences containing V -terms called V -sentences, sentences containing only O -terms called
observational or O -sentences, and sentences containing only T -terms called theoretical
or T -sentences. This assumption is implausible for ordinary languages, and has been
criticized in this regard (Putnam 1962). But the explicata assume an artificial language
that is designed to be ideal for a specific purpose, which in this case is the analysis of the
relation between theories and observations. And there is no reason to assume that it is
impossible to develop such an ideal language (Suppe 1972, §I), where it is encapsulated
in the vocabulary what is or is not observable (cf. Przełe˛cki 1974a, §III). Przełe˛cki (1969,
§10.II) has suggested to achieve this result by simply taking all terms in the sciences as
theoretical and introducing an artificial observational language. Friedman (1982, 276f)
suggests a similar strategy to capture the notion of an empirical substructure with the
help of a bipartition of the vocabulary. This is of specific interest because Van Fraassen
(1980, §3.6) has conjectured that this is impossible. Furthermore, the bipartition need not
stay fixed, but may change depending on the context (Rozeboom 1970, 201–203, Lewis
1970, 428). Reichenbach (1951, 49) suggests that the observation sentences should be
assumed to have “primitive meaning, i. e., a meaning which is not under investigation
during the analysis to be performed”. Under this suggestion, observation sentences do not
have to be about observations in any sense of the word, but must only be unproblematic
for the purposes at hand. According to Nielsen (1966, 15), for example, Flew’s charge
that theological statements are not falsifiable (Flew 1950) assumes that all and only “non-
religious, straightforwardly empirical, factual statements” have primitive meaning. And
Flew (1975, 274) claims that it is enough to assume that all and only statements about
“anything which happens or which conceivably might happen in the ordinary world” have
primitive meaning.1
All of the criteria in the following also refer to a consistent set of analytic sentences or
meaning postulates Π, sometimes bipartitioned into meaning postulates ΠO for O -terms
(cf. Carnap 1952), and meaning postulates ΠT for T -terms. The meaning postulates forO -terms are O -sentences, while those for T -terms are V -sentences, because they give the
T -terms’ relations to each other and to O -terms. Przełe˛cki (1974a, 345) argues that ΠT
should be O -conservative with respect to ΠO , that is, ΠT should place no restrictions onO -sentences or their interpretations beyond those given through ΠO . I will not make this
assumption, but rather generalize concepts and results where necessary. I do assume that Π
is closed under entailment, so that any set Λ of sentences withΠ  Λ is analytic (analytically
1These are only illustrations: I especially do not think that Flew’s circumscription of the O -sentences is
precise enough, since theological statements might be considered to be about the “ordinary world”.
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true). Any set of sentences incompatible with Π is analytically false; analytically true sets
and analytically false sets are analytically determined. Note that under this definition,
logically determined sets are also analytically determined. A set not analytically determined
is analytically contingent. Finally, Γ analytically entails Λ if and only if Γ ∪Π  Λ. Here
and in the following, a definition for sets of sentences holds for a single sentence if and
only if they hold for the sentence’s singleton set.
Once again, the assumption of a clearly delineated set of analytic sentences is plausible
for artificial languages (cf. Mates 1951, Martin 1952, Kemeny 1963), and it is important to
keep in mind that for an artificial language, analytic sentences are not found to be true,
but chosen to be true. The assumption of a set of analytic sentences is also not obviously a
restriction, since Π may be empty. On the other hand, letting Π = ∅ severely restricts the
inferences that are possible, excluding, for example, the inference from ‘function f is linear’
to ‘function f is continuous’. I will further discuss the role of Π in §9.2. Π determines
which O -sentences can be true within the chosen language, which suggests
Definition 1. A set of V -sentences Γ is possible if and only if Γ ∪Π has a model.
In other words, a set of V -sentences is possible if and only if it is compatible with Π.
Specifically, Π may restrict the sets of observation sentences that are compatible with the
rules of the language.
Unless it is tautologous, Π also puts restrictions on the possible interpretations of terms,
so that, say, every function in the extension of ‘linear’ must also be in the extension of
‘continuous’. Π therefore may restrict how the interpretations of observational terms relate.
To arrive at a formal definition, let A|O refer to the reduct of A to O , that is, the structure
that results from eliminating the interpretations of all T -terms from A. For an O -structure
AO , a structure B with B|O = AO is called an expansion of AO (Hodges 1993, 9). AnyO -structure that does not have an expansion to a model of Π is then impossible. Since a
V -structure is its own expansion, one can give
Definition 2. A structure is possible if and only if it can be expanded to a model of Π.
Below, I will make a distinction between syntactic and semantic criteria of empirical
significance based on whether the observations are described by sets of O -sentences or by
O -structures. With O -structures, observations can be described up to isomorphism, and
with O -sentences up to what I will call syntactical equivalence. Two structures A and B
are syntactically equivalent (A≡B) if and only if their respective theories are equivalent
(Th(A)  Th(B)), that is, for all sentences ϕ, A  ϕ if and only if B  ϕ. In first order
logic, syntactic equivalence is called elementary equivalence (and is not equivalent to
isomorphy).
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2.2 On the explicandum
As I will not discuss different conditions of adequacy, I will not attempt a thorough eluci-
dation of the explicandum of empirical significance. Rather, I will give a circumscription
precise enough to counter some common criticisms.
First, the criteria under discussion are meant to explicate empirical significance for
sentences, not terms. Whether this is a restriction at all is a matter of debate. While Carnap
(1956) considers criteria for terms possible and perhaps even preferable to criteria for
sentences (see also Hempel 1965b, §3), Przełe˛cki (1974a, 345f), for example, considers
such criteria misguided. And if criteria for terms do turn out to be desirable, the criteria for
sentences do not thereby become superfluous. Rather, they define empirical significance
under the condition that the object under scrutiny is a sentence, not a term.
The criteria are also not meant to determine the meaning of sentences as Ruja (1961),
for instance, assumes in his critique. Rynin (1957, 51ff) and Gemes (1998, §1.5) argue in
some detail that this is not the point of the criteria, but it is also obvious from their formal
structure: The criteria are classificatory (so that a sentence can be empirically significant or
not), while a criterion of meaning has to define a relation between sentences and meanings.
Pace Rynin (1957, 51), ‘empirical significance’ does not explicate ‘meaningfulness’,
either, because the meaning of a sentence is generally accepted to be determined by both
the sentence’s empirical import and the rules that govern its use with other sentences
(Carnap 1939, §25). Thus even a sentence not connected in the slightest to observation can
be meaningful (cf. Sober 2008, 149f). Whether there is more to the meaning of sentences
beyond their empirical import and relation to other sentences depends on the status of
semantic empiricism, which asserts the opposite (Rozeboom 1962, §II; Rozeboom 1970;
Przełe˛cki 1969, §§5f; Przełe˛cki 1974b, 402f). If a sentence can be meaningful without
being empirically significant, most of the criticisms by Hempel (1965b) are invalid (Hempel
1965c; Sober 2008, 149f). This understanding of the criteria as criteria for the empirical
meaningfulness of sentences is in line with Popper’s notion of his criterion as a demarcation
criterion between empirical and non-empirical sentences (Popper 1935, §4, §9; cf. Carnap
1963, §6.A).
Gemes (1998, §1.4) argues that a criterion of empirical significance does not have to
be a criterion of inductive confirmability as well. In the following, I will take the weaker
stance that a criterion of deductive empirical significance may differ significantly from a
criterion of inductive empirical significance, which in turn may differ from a criterion of
inductive confirmability. And since I will discuss the criteria in the following as criteria of
deductive empirical significance, not as criteria of inductive confirmability, some restrictions
on the criteria are overly restrictive. Hempel’s restriction of observational information
to finite sets of molecular sentences (Hempel 1965b, §2) is the best example of this. In
its stead, I will mainly rely on what Carnap sometimes calls the ‘extended observation
language’, which contains all sentences that contain only logical and O -terms (cf. Psillos
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2000, 158f). The language thus also includes all quantified sentences, and thus “empirical
laws” or “empirical generalizations” (Carnap 1966, 225–227). I will revisit restrictions on
the observation sentences in §9.1.
3 Falsifiability
3.1 Syntactic criteria
As I will discuss in §9.2, Hempel’s formulation of the falsifiability criterion deviates from
Popper’s original criterion in at least one crucial respect, but it can serve as a good
starting point for my discussion. Hempel (1965b, 106) states his “requirement of complete
falsifiability in principle” like this:
A sentence has empirical meaning if and only if its negation is not analytic
and follows logically from some finite logically consistent class of observation
sentences.
Since I am here not interested in criteria of confirmability, I will drop Hempel’s requirement
that the set of observational sentences be finite. For two reasons, I will also allow the
analytic entailment of the sentence’s negation. First, analytic entailment is a simple
generalization of logical entailment that can be undone by demanding that Π be empty.
Second, only tautological T -sentences follow from a consistent set of O -sentences, and
therefore no T -sentences have empirical meaning according to Hempel’s definition. Finally,
I will generalize the criterion for sentences to a criterion for sets of sentences because
this allows the discussion of theories that cannot be finitely axiomatized and thus not be
described in a single sentence. The generalization is straightforward: If α is a sentence and
Γ a set thereof, then Γ  ¬α if and only if Γ ∪ {α}  ⊥, where ‘⊥’ is some contradiction.
And in the second formula, the restriction to a singleton set is superfluous. With these
modifications and my terminology, the criterion says that a set of sentences is empirically
significant if and only if it is syntactically falsifiable and not analytically false.
Definition 3. A set Ω of sentences falsifies a set Λ of sentences if and only if Ω ∪Λ∪Π ⊥.
Definition 4. A set Λ of V -sentences is syntactically falsifiable if and only if it is falsified by
a possible set of O -sentences.
As noted, the qualifier ‘syntactic’ here does not refer to the use of syntactic deduction (‘`’),
but to the syntactic description of observations (by sentences). Since a falsifiable sentence
cannot be analytic, the criterion of empirical significance could also be formulated as the
demand that a sentence be syntactically falsifiable and analytically contingent.
Even though I have defined ‘O -sentence’ to be any sentence containing only O -terms,
this criterion, like all other syntactic criteria in the following, only presumes that the
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O -sentences form some distinguished set of sentences. The syntactic criteria thus do not
rely on a bipartition of the vocabulary.
The criterion of falsifiability is typically introduced with the observation that few
universally quantified sentences are entailed by molecular observational sentences, but
their negations may be so entailed. But even assuming that most scientific laws can be
given as universally quantified sentences, this purely formal observation is no justification
of the criterion. The most important justification rather relies implicitly on the notion of
O -conservativeness, which is a necessary condition for explicit definitions (cf. Belnap 1993;
Gupta 2009, §2.1).
Definition 5. A set Λ of V -sentences is syntactically O -conservative with respect to a set
∆ of V -sentences if and only if for any set Ω of O -sentences and for any O -sentence ω,
Ω ∪Λ∪∆ ω only if Ω ∪∆ ω.
A set of V -sentences is O -creative with respect to ∆ if and only if it is not O -conservative
with respect to ∆.
If a logic is compact, Ω ∪ Λ ∪∆  ω if and only if there is a finite set Ω′ such that
Ω′∪Λ∪∆ ω. This is equivalent to Λ∪∆  ¬ ∧Ω′→ω, where∧Ω′ is the conjunction
of all elements of Ω′. Hence for first order logic, the use of the set Ω in definition 5 is
superfluous if the set of observation sentences is closed under truth functional composition.
That the definition of a new term not in O must be O -conservative encapsulates the idea
“that the definition not have any consequences (other than those consequences involving
the defined word itself) that were not obtainable already without the definition”, as Belnap
(1993, 123) puts it. Thus, a set that is syntactically O -conservative with respect to Π
sanctions no inferences between O -sentences that are not already sanctioned by Π. In
the following, O -conservativeness simpliciter is understood to be O -conservativeness with
respect to Π.
Popper’s justification of falsifiability essentially starts from O -creativity because he
demands “that the theory allow us to deduce, roughly speaking, more empirical singular
statements than we can deduce from the initial conditions alone” (Popper 1935, 85). By
assuming that the negation of an observation sentence is itself an observation sentence, he
arrives at his definition of falsifiability:
Claim 1. A set Λ of V -sentences is syntactically falsifiable iff Λ is syntactically O -creative with
respect to Π.
Proof. ‘⇒’: If Ω ∪Λ∪Π  ⊥, then Ω ∪Λ∪Π ω for any observation sentence ω. Since
Ω ∪Π 6⊥, there is some ω such that Ω ∪Π 6ω.
‘⇐’: For ω and Ω with Ω ∪ Λ ∪ Π  ω and Ω ∪ Π 6 ω, Ω ∪ {¬ω} ∪ Π 6 ⊥ and
Ω ∪ {¬ω} ∪Λ∪Π ⊥.
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The relation between falsifiability and O -creativity provides a justification for Reichen-
bach’s (and Nielsen’s and Flew’s) claim that the O -sentences only need to be unproblematic:
The theory of definition and the concept of O -creativity are independent of the meaning of
the O -terms.
Sticking with the standard interpretation of O -sentences, a falsifiable sentence could
be said to have empirical import, where “a sentence S has empirical import if from S
in conjunction with suitable subsidiary hypotheses it is possible to derive observation
sentences which are not derivable from the subsidiary hypotheses alone” (suitable sub-
sidiary hypotheses for falsifiability being analytic and observational). It is one of the cruel
jokes of philosophical terminology that in this quote, Hempel (1965b, 106) describes
Ayer’s two criteria of verifiability. Accordingly, the justification that Ayer provides for his
criteria complements Popper’s justification. Ayer (1936, 97ff) argues that the function of
an empirical hypothesis is to predict experiences, and thus arrives at his first criterion of
empirical significance, namely that “the mark of a genuine factual proposition [is] that
some experiential propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other
premises without being deducible from those other premises alone”, where an experiential
proposition “records an actual or possible observation” (Ayer 1946, 38f).
Because no restriction is put on the “certain other premises”, Ayer’s first criterion
is trivial in that it includes every non-analytic sentence (cf. Lewis 1988a). One way to
avoid this triviality is to demand that the other premises be O -sentences, which makes the
criterion equivalent to O -creativity. Instead, Ayer (1946, 13) proposes two definitions. The
first stipulates that
a statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation-statement, or
is such that in conjunction with one or more observation-statements it entails
at least one observation-statement which is not deducible from these other
premises alone [ . . . ].
If ‘entailment’ is understood as ‘analytic entailment’2 and the criterion is meant as a
necessary and sufficient condition, this can be paraphrased as
Definition 6. A V -sentence α is directly verifiable if and only if α is an O -sentence or
there is some set Ω of O -sentences and an O -sentence ω such that Ω ∪ {α} ∪Π ω and
Ω ∪Π 6ω.
Without any assumptions about the set of observation sentences, this follows immediately:
Claim 2. A V -sentence α is directly verifiable iff α is an O -sentence or is syntactically O -
creative with respect to Π.
2This is what Ayer seems to do, since he calls translations from one language into another ‘logically
equivalent’ (Ayer 1946, 6f). Lewis (1988b, §II, fn. 5) gives an independent argument for reading Ayer in this
way, but also notes that this entails some redundancies in Ayer’s definitions.
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The condition that α may be an O -sentence is not redundant because α may be analytic
and therefore not O -creative with respect to Π.
In his second definition, Ayer (1946, 13) proposes
to say that a statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies the following condi-
tions: first, that in conjunction with certain other premises [Γ ] it entails one
or more directly verifiable statements [β] which are not deducible from these
other premises alone; and secondly, that these other premises do not include
any statement that is not either analytic, or directly verifiable, or capable of
being independently established as indirectly verifiable.
Since analytic entailment already allows the inclusion of Π in the premises of an inference,
Π can be dropped from the auxiliary assumptions Γ . In the special case that Γ is a set of
O -sentences and β an O -sentence as well, indirect verifiability reduces to direct verifiability
(cf. Pokriefka 1983),3 so that Γ can contain O -sentences instead of directly verifiable
sentences. Ayer’s criterion can then be stated as
Definition 7. A V -sentence α is indirectly verifiable if and only if there is a set Γ of
indirectly verifiable or O -sentences and a sentence β that is directly verifiable such that
{α} ∪ Γ ∪Π  β and Γ ∪Π 6 β .
Church (1949) shows that for any sentence, as long as there are three logically inde-
pendent observational sentences, the sentence or its negation is indirectly verifiable, a
trivialization that is possible even if β is required to be an O -sentence. This trivialization
can be avoided by restricting both Γ and β to O -sentences, but this more exclusive version
of indirect verifiability then again just amounts to O -creativity and falsifiability.
In connection with his first criterion, Ayer (1936, 38) argues that a “hypothesis cannot
be conclusively confuted any more than it can be conclusively verified”, but that a sentence
is verifiable “if it is possible for experience to render it probable” (Ayer 1936, 37). Ayer
(1936, 99) then argues that “if an observation to which a given proposition is relevant
conforms to our expectations, the truth of that proposition is confirmed. [Then] one can say
that its probability has been increased.” ‘Probability’ is here not used in its mathematical
sense, but as a measure of our “confidence” in a proposition (Ayer 1936, 100). Thus
Ayer develops his criterion under the assumption that a sentence is confirmed if one of its
consequences turns out to be true. This prediction criterion of confirmation is discussed and
rejected by Hempel (1965d, §7). Gemes (1998, §1.4) discusses its historical importance in
the search for criteria of empirical significance and argues that the failure of Ayer’s criterion
is inherited from the failure of the prediction criterion of confirmation.
3This holds even without the assumption needed for Church’s trivialization proof given below, simply
by restricting Γ and β; hence I consider it an innocent observation that does not just transform one trivial
criterion into another one.
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3.2 Semantic criteria
Syntactic O -conservativeness has a semantic counterpart:
Definition 8. A set Λ of V -sentences is semantically O -conservative with respect to a set
∆ of V -sentences if and only if for each O -structure AO for which there is a V -structure
B ∆ with B|O = AO , there is also a V -structure C ∆∪Λ with C|O = AO .
Definition 8 is slightly more general than that given, for example, by Przełe˛cki (1974a,
345), so that it allows for any V -sentence in ∆. A description of the generalization is given
in appendix A. Note that, like the other semantic definitions up to §8.1, this definition
relies essentially on a bipartition of the vocabulary.
As announced in §2.1, the difference between semantic and syntactic conservativeness
lies in the precision of the observational information:
Claim 3. A set Λ of V -sentences is syntactically O -conservative with respect to ∆ iff for each
O -structure AO for which there is a V -structureB ∆ withB|O ≡ AO , there is a V -structure
C ∆∪Λ with C|O ≡ AO .
Proof. ‘⇒’: Assume AO is syntactically equivalent to a structure that can be expanded to a
modelB of∆. Then chooseΩ∪{¬ω} equivalent to Th(AO ). I follows thatB  Ω∪{¬ω}∪∆
and thus Ω ∪∆ 6 ω. By syntactic O -conservativeness, Ω ∪ Λ ∪∆ 6 ω, so there is a
C  Ω ∪ {¬ω} ∪Λ∪∆  Th(AO )∪Λ∪∆. Thus there is a C  Λ∪∆ such that C|O ≡ AO .
‘⇐’: Let Ω ∪∆ 6 ω. Choose A  Ω ∪∆∪ {¬ω}; by assumption, there is a C  Λ∪Λ
with C|O ≡ A|O and thus C  Ω ∪Λ∪∆∪ {¬ω}, so that Ω ∪Λ∪∆ 6ω.
This suggests
Claim 4. A set Λ of V -sentences is semantically O -conservative with respect to ∆ only if Λ is
syntactically O -conservative with respect to ∆. The converse does not hold in first order logic.
Proof. ‘⇒’: From claim 3 because A|O =B|O only if A|O ≡B|O .
‘6⇐’: See appendix B.
Of course, the two criteria are equivalent in all languages in which syntactic equivalence
amounts to isomorphy.
A short overview of mainly philosophical treatments of the relation is given in ap-
pendix B. Because of the difference between syntactic and semantic O -conservativeness,
it may not always be possible to bipartition the set of analytic sentences Π such that ΠT
is semantically O -conservative with respect to ΠO : If Π is only syntactically conservative
with respect to ΠO , there are some O -models of ΠO that cannot be expanded to models of
Π, and there is no O -sentence that excludes all and only those structures when added to
ΠO .
The analogy between syntactic and semantic O -conservativeness suggests a semantic
criterion of falsifiability analogous to syntactic falsifiability.
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Definition 9. An O -structure AO falsifies a set Λ of V -sentences if and only if for all C Π
with C|O = AO , C 6 Λ.
In other words, a structure AO falsifies Λ if and only if Λ is false in every possible
structure that is an expansion of AO .
Definition 10. A set Λ of V -sentences is semantically falsifiable if and only if it is falsified
by a possible O -structure.
Now the following holds:
Claim 5. A set Λ of V -sentences is semantically falsifiable iff Λ is semantically O -creative
with respect to Π.
Proof. Λ is semantically O -creative with respect to Π iff there is an AO that has an
expansion B  Π (which is always the case since Π is consistent) and every expansion
C Π of AO is such that C 6 Λ. This holds iff Λ is semantically falsifiable.
The relation between syntactic and semantic falsifiability is then given by claims 5, 4
and 1.
David Lewis argues that one of his explications of ‘partial aboutness’ is closely con-
nected to syntactic falsifiability. To see that it is even more closely connected to semantic
falsifiability, consider first Lewis’s explication of ‘aboutness’ as supervenience. According to
Lewis (1988b, 136), a “statement is entirely about some subject matter iff its truth value
supervenes on that subject matter. Two possible worlds which are exactly alike so far as that
subject matter is concerned must both make the statement true, or else both make it false”.
Assuming that possible worlds are all and only those worlds in which all analytic sentences
are true, and assuming that all statements can be expressed by sets of V -sentences, there is
a one-to-one mapping from possible worlds to V -structures (cf. Kemeny 1963, §IV). Lewis
does not explicate what it means for possible worlds to be “exactly alike” with respect
to observation (except that ‘being exactly alike’ is an equivalence relation), so I suggest
the following: Two possible worlds are exactly alike if and only if the reducts of their
corresponding structures to O are identical. This leads to
Definition 11. A set Λ of V -sentences is about observation if and only if for any V -structures
A,B Π with A|O =B|O it holds that A  Λ iff B  Λ.
To distinguish aboutness more clearly from partial aboutness, I will also sometimes
speak of sentences being entirely about observation when they are about observation.
Lewis (1988b, §VII, footnote removed) suggests to weaken definition 11 based on an
ordinary language analysis of the modifier ‘partly’:
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The recipe for modifying X by ‘partly’ is something like this. Think of the
situation to which X , unmodified, applies. Look for an aspect of that situation
that has parts, and therefore can be made partial. Make it partial—and there
you have a situation to which ‘partly X ’ could apply. If you find several aspects
that could be made partial, you have ambiguity.
In this case, X stands for ‘Statement S is about observation’. Lewis identifies four different
aspects of the situation that have parts. The most obvious aspect is S itself, but considering
parts of it leads Lewis (1988b, §XI) to a criterion that distinguishes between logically
equivalent sentences. Another aspect is the subject matter—in this case, the observations.
In order to arrive at a non-trivial criterion, Lewis (1988b, §IX) must assume that it is
clear what it means for a subject matter to be “close-knit” and either “sufficiently large” or
“sufficiently important”. Clarifying these terms may, however, lead to an infinite regress, for
instance if it turns out that a subject matter is close-knit if and only if the sufficiently large
or important parts are partially about each other. Making the supervenience partial leads
Lewis (1988b, §X) to a probabilistic conception of empirical significance, although I will
argue in §7 that this is not the only option. Only his treatment of the content of a statement
stays within the boundaries of predicate logic, if the above translation from modal semantics
into model theory is assumed. Lewis (1988b, §VIII) defines the content of a statement
as the set E of possible worlds that it excludes. In the model theoretic paraphrase, the
content of a set Λ of sentences is thus given by EΛ := {A
 A Π and A 6 Λ}. The content
of Λ is about observation iff Λ itself is about observation, which is the case iff for any two
B,C  Π with B|O = C|O , B ∈ EΛ iff C ∈ EΛ. The parts of the content of Λ are then
defined as the subsets of EΛ, which leads to
Definition 12. Part of the content of a set Λ of V -sentences is about observation if and only
if there is a non-empty set of structures F ⊆ EΛ := A  A  Π and A 6 Λ	 such that for
any two B,C Π with B|O = C|O , B ∈ F iff C ∈ F .
Lewis does not demand F to be non-empty, but without this restriction, part of the
content of every sentence is about observation. If there is a way to capture any content
(any set of possible worlds) by a sentence, Lewis (1988b, §VIII) notes, part of the content
of a sentence is about observation iff the sentence is syntactically falsifiable.4 This relation
can be made more precise with
Claim 6. Part of the content of a set Λ of V -sentences is about observation iff Λ is semantically
falsifiable.
4To be more precise, since Lewis does not demand F to be non-empty, he can show that part of a statement’s
content is about observation iff the statement is incompatible with some statement entirely about observation.
But according to definition 11 and Lewis (1988b, 141) himself, contradictions are entirely about observation,
and since contradictions are incompatible with every statement, this shows that his definition is trivial.
Demanding F to be non-empty excludes contradictions.
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Proof. ‘⇒’: Assume part F ⊆ EΛ of Λ’s content is about observation. Define AO := A|O for
some A ∈ F . Since A ∈ F and according to definition 12 either all B with B|O = AO are in
F or none is, all such B are in F . Since all such B are also in EΛ, B 6 Λ, and the possible
structure AO falsifies Λ.
‘⇐’: Assume Λ is semantically falsified by AO . Define F := B  B  Π and B|O =
AO
	
. Since ∅ 6= F ⊆ EΛ, part of Λ’s content is about observation.
Because of claims 1, 5, and 6, the relation between syntactic falsifiability and Lewis’s
definition for sets of sentences part of whose content is about observation is the same as
that between syntactic and semantic O -creativity, which is given in claim 3.
A sentence whose content is partly about observation could also be said to have some
observational content, and indeed this is essentially how Carnap (1928, 327f) described a
criterion of meaningfulness at the time of the Vienna circle (see page 29). Decades later,
he argued that, absent sentences already established as analytic, the observational content
of a sentence α is given by its Ramsey sentence R(α), the existential quantification over all
T -terms in α (Psillos 2000). R(α) plausibly describes α’s observational content because it
entails the same O -sentences as α itself (Rozeboom 1962, 291ff). Now, just as a criterion
of the meaning of a set of sentences is not a criterion of empirical significance, neither is a
description of the observational content of such a set. Something weaker is needed, namely
a criterion to determine when the observational content is non-empty. Since anything that
is already entailed by the analytic sentences is not an empirical claim, this suggests
Definition 13. If Π can be finitely axiomatized, let Π˜ be this axiomatization. Then a
V -sentence α has O -content if and only if Π˜ 6 R α∧∧ Π˜.
Under this definition, Carnap’s later notion of O -content squares well with the notion
of falsifiability:
Claim 7. If Π can be finitely axiomatized, then a V -sentence α has O -content iff α is
semantically O -creative with respect to Π.
Proof. A sentence α is Ramseyfied by substituting every T -term Ti , 1≤ i ≤ n in α by a vari-
able X i and existentially quantifying over each X i , leading to ∃X1 . . . Xnα[T1/X1, . . . , Tn/Xn].
Define g : {Ti}1≤i≤n→ {X i}1≤i≤n, Ti 7→ X i .
‘⇐’: Assume that α has no O -content. Since R α ∧ ∧ Π˜ is an O -sentence,
Π˜  R
 
α ∧∧ Π˜ if and only if R Π˜  R α ∧∧ Π˜. Then for any AO , AO  R ∧ Π˜
only if AO  R
 
α ∧ ∧ Π˜. Thus for any AO , if there is a satisfaction function v
mapping each variable X i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n to an extension of the same type over |AO |
such that AO , v 
∧
Π˜[T1/X1, . . . , Tn/Xn], there is a satisfaction function v′ such that
AO , v′ 
 
α ∧ ∧ Π˜[T1/X1, . . . , Tn/Xn]. Now assume that AO can be expanded to
a model B  Π˜. B = 〈|B| , f 〉 with domain |B| and a function f that maps every
V -term to an extension of the same type in |B|. Since |B| = AO , any extension v
15
Sebastian Lutz Criteria of Empirical Significance: A Success Story—Draft: 2010–12–11
of f |{T1, . . . , Tn} ◦ g−1 to all variables of the language is a satisfaction function such
that AO , v 
∧
Π˜[T1/X1, . . . , Tn/Xn]. By assumption, there is then a satisfaction func-
tion v′ such that AO , v′ 
 
α ∧ ∧ Π˜[T1/X1, . . . , Tn/Xn]. Then any extension f of
v′|{X1, . . . , Xn} ◦ g to all T -terms can be used to expand AO to a model of ∧ Π˜ ∧α, and
therefore α is semantically O -conservative with respect to Π˜.
‘⇒’: Similar.
4 Verifiability
Another criterion of empirical significance that has been proposed very early on is that
of syntactic verifiability (Hempel 1965b, 104). Modifying Hempel’s formulation in an
analogous way to his formulation of falsifiability leads to
Definition 14. A set Ω of V -sentences verifies a set Λ of V -sentences if and only if Ω∪Π  Λ.
Definition 15. A set Λ of V -sentences is syntactically verifiable if and only if there is a
possible set Ω of O -sentences that verifies Λ.
A set of sentences is then empirically significant if and only if it is analytically contingent
and syntactically verifiable.
Hempel (1965b, 106) points out the following straightforward
Claim 8. A V -sentence α is syntactically verifiable iff ¬α is syntactically falsifiable.
The restriction to single sentences is essential, since there is no straightforward gener-
alization of negation to arbitrary sets of sentences.
It seems appropriate to also give a semantic version of verifiability.
Definition 16. An O -structure AO verifies a set Λ of V -sentences if and only if for all C Π
with C|O = AO , C  Λ.
Definition 17. A set Λ of V -sentences is semantically verifiable if and only if there is a
possible O -structure that verifies Λ.
And again, the following can easily be shown to hold:
Claim 9. A V -sentence α is semantically verifiable iff ¬α is semantically falsifiable.
The relations between syntactic and semantic falsifiability described in claims 3 and 4
therefore transfer to the verifiability of sentences. Furthermore, claims 9 and 7 entail the
following:
Claim 10. If Π can be finitely axiomatized, let Π˜ be this axiomatization. Then a V -sentence
α is semantically verifiable iff Π˜ 6 R ¬α∧∧ Π˜.
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Even if the observational content of α is considered to be the set of possible O -sentences
or O -structures that verify α, however, R(¬α ∧ Π˜) is not the observational content of α.
Rather, it can be shown similarly to the proof of claim 7 that the possible O -structures
that verify α are the models of ¬R(¬α∧ Π˜). And this sentence is also analytically entailed
by the same O -sentences as α, since ω ∧∧ Π˜  α if and only if ¬α ∧∧ Π˜  ¬ω, which
holds if and only if R
 ¬α∧∧ Π˜  ¬ω, and thus if and only if ω  ¬R ¬α∧∧ Π˜. The
connection to claim 10 is rather that α is verifiable if and only if its observational content is
not empty, which it is if Π entails that ¬R(¬α∧ Π˜) has no models, that is, Π˜  R(¬α∧ Π˜).5
For sets of sentences, a relation analogous to claim 3 holds as well:
Claim 11. A set Λ of V -sentences is syntactically verifiable iff there is a possible O -structure
AO such that Λ is verified by each possible O -structure syntactically equivalent to AO .
Proof. ‘⇒’: Assume that the possible set of O -sentences Ω verifies Λ. Then for every
B  Ω ∪Π, B  Λ. Since Ω is possible, there is some such B. Choose AO =B|O . Then
every C with C|O ≡ AO is such that C  Ω. Since for every possible O -structure syntactically
equivalent to AO , there is such a C, every possible O -structure syntactically equivalent to
AO verifies Λ.
‘⇐’: Assume that every possible O -structure syntactically equivalent to AO verifies Λ.
Choose Ω  Th(AO ). Since AO is possible, Ω ∪Π has a model, and thus Ω is possible. By
assumption, B  Ω ∪Π only if B  Λ, and thus Ω verifies Λ.
As in the case of falsifiability, semantic verifiability is like syntactic verifiability, except
that the observational information is given by structures, not sets of sentences. Substituting
in claim 11 ‘verifiable’ by ‘falsifiable’ and ‘verified’ by ‘falsified’ results in a simple paraphrase
of claim 3 that makes this analogy obvious.
5 Falsifiability and verifiability
Calling a sentence empirically significant if and only if it is both falsifiable and verifiable en-
sures that the negation of any empirically significant sentence is also empirically significant.
For this reason, Hempel (1965c, 122) considers a version of this criterion that allows only
finite sets of molecular observational sentences, but rejects it as too strong. Rynin (1957,
51) also rejects such a finite version of this criterion. Furthermore, Sober (2008, 149f) has
argued that the negations of empirically significant sentences do not have to be themselves
empirically significant—unlike, arguably, the negations of meaningful sentences. In that
case, Hempel’s motivation cannot be used for criteria of empirical significance.
5If R(α∧ Π˜) is akin to the “canonical commitment of the content that” α as described by Peacocke (1986,
47), then ¬R(¬α∧ Π˜) is akin to the “canonical ground for the content that” α.
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A real, though small, advantage of the criterion is that a sentence that is both verifiable
and falsifiable is automatically analytically contingent, and therefore the criterion can be
formulated without demanding analytic contingency explicitly. Probably the main reason
for using this criterion is that it is a sufficient condition for empirical significance for
both proponents of falsifiability and proponents of verifiability (see Kitts (1977) for an
example of this kind of argument). This dialectical advantage and the slight convenience
in formulation cannot, however, outweigh the criterion’s lack of other justifications.
6 Strong O -determinacy
Given that the conjunction of falsifiability and verifiability had already been considered too
strong a criterion of empirical significance by Hempel and Rynin, it may seem surprising
that even stronger criteria have been suggested since. But, first, Hempel and Rynin explicitly
only reject criteria that rely on finite sets of observational sentences. Second, the stronger
criteria have advantages not found in the conjunction of falsifiability and verifiability.
Przełe˛cki (1974a, §I) suggests a criterion of empirical significance for sentences that
can easily be generalized to sets thereof:6
Definition 18. An O -structure AO determines a set Λ of V -sentences if and only if for allV -structures B,C Π with B|O = C|O = AO it holds that B  Λ iff C  Λ.
Definition 19. A set Λ of V -sentences is strongly semantically O -determined if and only if
it is determined by every possible O -structure.
Since this definition includes analytically determined sentences, a set of sentences
should be called empirically significant if and only if it is strongly semantically O -
determined and analytically contingent.
The truth value of a strongly semantically O -determined set Λ of sentences is fixed by
any interpretation of the observational terms in any domain, because Λ is either true in all
possible models that expand such an O -structure, or it is false in all such models. Hence
Claim 12. A set Λ of V -sentences is strongly semantically O -determined if and only if every
possible O -structure either falsifies or verifies Λ.
As Przełe˛cki (1974a, 346f) already notes, this definition is very exclusive. If, for ex-
ample, the theoretical term T1 is conditionally defined by {∀x[O1 x → (O2 x ↔ T1 x)]}=:
Π, and ‘O1’, ‘O2’, and ‘o’ are observational terms, then the possible structure AO =〈{1,2}, {〈O1, {1}〉, 〈O2, {1}〉, 〈o, 2〉}〉 does not determine T1(o). Therefore, T1(o) is not
strongly semantically O -determined. This is unsurprising, because, in Lewis’s terminology,
the definition includes only sentences that are entirely about observation:
6Przełe˛cki (1969, 93) calls sentences that fulfill a special case of this criterion “strongly determined” (cf.
Przełe˛cki 1974a, n. 2). Whence my choice of terminology.
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Claim 13. A set Λ of V -sentences is strongly semantically O -determined iff Λ is about
observation.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Assume B,C  Π, B|O = C|O . Then B|O is a possible O -structure, and by
assumption, B  Λ iff C  Λ.
‘⇐’: Assume AO is a possible O -structure. For any two possible V -structures B, C with
B|O = AO and C|O = AO , B|O = C|O and thus, by assumption, B  Λ iff C  Λ.
That the criterion is relevant despite being exclusive is shown by a justification very
attuned to the needs of the measuring scientist and questions of symmetry. Suppes (1959,
131) begins his justification with the idea that
[a]n empirical hypothesis, or any statement in fact, which uses numerical
quantities is empirically meaningful only if its truth value is invariant under
the appropriate transformations of the numerical quantities involved.
The numerical quantities are functions, and transformations that lead only from one
adequate function to another are appropriate (Suppes 1959, 132). To be adequate, a
function has to fulfill the conditions of adequacy for the measurement it represents. Suppes
(1959, 135) states the conditions for functions m representing mass measurement as
Πmass := {∀x∀y (x ­ y↔ mx ≤ my),
∀x∀y (m(x ∗ y) = mx + my)} , (1)
where ‘­’ stands for ‘is at most as heavy as’, ‘∗’ stands for physical combination, and x
and y are silently understood to range over physical objects. Suppes (1959, 135) notes
that “the functional composition of any similarity transformation ϕ with the function m
yields a function ϕ ◦m which also satisfies” Πmass, where a similarity transformation in
Suppes’s sense is also called a positive linear transformation. Therefore, Suppes (1959,
138) suggests that
a formula S [ . . . ] is empirically meaningful [ . . . ] if and only if S is satisfied
in a model M [ . . . ] when and only when it is satisfied in every model [ . . . ]
related to M by a similarity transformation.
To connect Suppes’s criterion to Lewis’s and thereby to Przełe˛cki’s, note first that ­
and ∗ play the role of observational terms with some set of axioms ΠO (Suppes 1959, 135,
n. 7), and m is the sole theoretical term. Now let B[m/ϕ ◦mB] be the structure that B
becomes when m is interpreted by ϕ ◦mB instead of mB. Suppes’s criterion of adequacy
can then be paraphrased like this:7
7Przełe˛cki’s paraphrase is slightly different, for one because he aims to prove its equivalence with defini-
tion 19, not definition 11, but also because his definition of O -conservativeness is slightly less general (see
appendix A).
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Definition 20 (Empirically meaningful statements about mass). Assume the standard
interpretation for arithmetical terms. Then a V -sentence α is empirically meaningful if and
only if for any B ΠO ∪Πmass and any C, if C=B[m/ϕ ◦mB] and ϕ is a positive linear
transformation, then B  α if and only if C  α.
Suppes justifies the demand that truth values have to be invariant under positive
linear transformations on the grounds that all and only such transformations lead from
one function m that fulfills Πmass to another. This is basically what motivates strongO -determinacy as well.
Claim 14. Assume T = {m}, ΠT =Πmass and the standard interpretation for arithmetical
terms. Then a V -sentence α is empirically meaningful according to definition 20 iff α is about
observation.
Proof. Przełe˛cki (1974a, 349).
In claim 14, the interpretations of + and ≤ are assumed to be fixed. Przełe˛cki (1974a,
347f) assumes that this is ensured by a semantic restriction on the possible structures. One
could also ensure the standard interpretation with the usual axioms in second order logic.
Suppes’s conditions of adequacy determine admissible transformations for mass mea-
surements, which in turn determine meaningful sentences about mass. Przełe˛cki’s result
shows that for these sentences, empirical meaningfulness can be defined equivalently
without using admissible transformations. I now want to show that this is also possible for
general sentences about measurements.
Essentially following Suppes and Zinnes (1963), Roberts and Franke (1976) define the
general notion of meaningfulness just illustrated using the concepts of relational systems,
measures, and scales. A relational system is a structure with p ki-ary relations (1≤ i ≤ p)
and q binary functions. A measure µ is defined as a homomorphism from one relational
system E= 〈|E| , {〈R1, RE1〉, . . . , 〈Rp, REp〉}, {〈◦1,◦E1 〉, . . . , 〈◦q,◦Eq 〉}〉, sometimes called ‘empiri-
cal’, to another relational system F = 〈|F| , {〈Q1,QF1〉, . . . , 〈Qp,QFp〉}, {〈∗1,∗F1〉, . . . , 〈∗q,∗Fq 〉}〉,
sometimes called ‘formal’. A homomorphism (an element of hom(E,F)) is a function
µ : |E| → |F| such that for all aE1 , . . . , aEki , aE, bE ∈ |E|with i = 1, . . . , p and for all j = 1, . . . , q
it holds that
REi
 
aE1 , . . . , a
E
ki

iff QFi
 
µ(aE1 ), . . . ,µ(a
E
ki
)

,
µ
 
aE ◦Ej bE

= µ(aE) ∗Fj µ(bE) .
(2)
The triple of an empirical relational system, a formal system, and a measure is then called
a scale. Roberts and Franke (1976) argue that for questions of meaningfulness, the notion
of an admissible transformation is (in my notation) best captured as follows:
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If 〈E,F,µ〉 is a scale, then an admissible transformation ψ relative to E, F, and
µ is any mapping of µ into a function ψ(µ) : |E| → |F| such that ψ(µ) is also
in hom(E,F).
Their argument for this definition rests on the explication of ‘meaningfulness’ by Suppes
and Zinnes (1963, 66), who suggest that a
numerical statement is meaningful if and only if its truth (or falsity) is constant
under admissible scale transformations of any of its numerical assignments[,]
where numerical assignments are measures.
The concept of a scale is defined by the relation between two structures. To capture it,
like Suppes (1959) does, in a single structure A, one can define A as having the structures
E and F as relativized reducts (Hodges 1993, §5.1). In this case, let A have some domain
|A| ⊇ |E| ∪ |F| and a vocabulary A containing the vocabularies E of E and F of F, a
function symbol f interpreted by the measurement µ, and two unary predicates E and
F interpreted by |E| and |F|, respectively. The relativized reduct A|EE is the substructure
of A|E whose domain is EA = |E|.8 The relativization theorem then says that for every
formula ϕ of E (F ) and its relativization ϕ(E) (ϕ(F)) ofA , it holds that that E  ϕ (F  ϕ)
if and only if A  ϕ(E) (A  ϕ(F)) (Hodges 1993, Theorem 5.1.1). In a relativization ϕ(P),
all quantifications in the formula ϕ are restricted by the predicate P. For any set Λ of
formulas, define Λ(P) as the set of the relativization of the elements of Λ.
Now, letΠscale determine the possible measurement scales, that is, the relativized reduct
to F and F of every model of Πscale is isomorphic to the formal structure F, and the class
of relativized reducts to E and E of all models of Πscale is the class of possible empirical
structures. Since I am not assuming partial functions, but will need a substructure of A
with the domain |E| ∪ |F|, define the extensions of the functions in E to |A| so that their
restrictions to |F| are full functions, and analogously for the functions in F. This is nothing
but a technically convenient convention. Restricting the domain of µ = f A to |E| = EA
results in a measure from E to F if and only if, first, the range of µ is |F| = FA, and second,
µ fulfills the conditions of adequacy (2). This is the case if and only if A Πadeq with
Πadeq :=
∀a(Ea→ F f a)	∪
p⋃
i=1
¦∀a1 . . .∀aki Ea1 ∧ · · · ∧ Eaki → Ria1 . . . aki ↔Q i f a1 . . . f aki©∪
q⋃
j=1
¦∀a∀bEa ∧ Eb→ f (a ◦ j b) = f a ∗ j f b© .
(3)
8A substructure of a structure A is a structure B for the same terms and with |B| ⊆ |A| that agrees with A
on all interpretations of the terms over |B| (Hodges 1993, 6f). A is called an extension of B.
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Πadeq is a generalization of the conditions of adequacy Πmass for mass measurements, with
the relativization of the quantifiers to physical objects made explicit. Again only to avoid
partial functions, let f furthermore map any elements of |F| to |E| ∪ |F|. All in all, A is
determined by a set Πscale that entails Πadeq, the restrictions on F and possible empirical
structures, and the additional restriction on the extensions of the functions in E and F
discussed above. Note that |A| can be a proper superset of |E| ∪ |F|, andA can be a proper
superset of E ∪F . This can ease the formalization of the relations and functions in E and
F by allowing, for example, the language and objects of set theory.
By construction of Πscale, any A  Πscale fulfills the admissibility conditions for the
relativized reduction to E ∪F ∪ { f } =: EF f and 〈λx . Ex ∨ F x〉 =: EF (Hodges 1993,
203), so that A|EF f EF exists. Because of the relativization theorem, A|EF f EF  Λ if and
only if A  Λ(EF) for any EF f -sentence Λ. Defining ΛA to be the set theoretic conditions
on the extensions of the terms in Λ that have to hold for Λ to be true in A, it therefore
holds for any set Λ of EF f -sentences that A  Λ(EF) if and only if ΛA|EF f EF is true for the
scale 〈E,F,µ〉, where A|EE = E and A|FF = F.
The definition of admissible transformation argued for by Roberts and Franke (1976)
can now be paraphrased as such:
Definition 21. If A  Πscale, then an admissible transformation ϕ relative to A is any
mapping of f A into a function ϕ( f A) such that A[ f /ϕ( f A)] Πadeq.
The explication of ‘meaningfulness’ by Suppes and Zinnes (1963) assumes the two
concepts of a scale and an admissible transformation, and like the definition of meaningful-
ness for mass measurements by Suppes (1959), demands that a statement about 〈E,F,µ〉
be invariant under the admissible transformations of any adequate measure. This can be
generalized to all EF f -sentences (rather than only their relativizations to EF):
Definition 22. A set Λ of EF f -sentences is strongly invariant if and only if for any
A  Πscale and any admissible transformation ϕ relative to A, it holds that A  Λ iff
A[ f /ϕ( f A)]  Λ.
This is indeed a generalization of the original definition by Suppes and Zinnes (1963):
Claim 15. A set Λ(EF) of EF f -sentences is strongly invariant if and only if ΛA|EF f EF is
meaningful for any scale 〈E,F,µ〉 according to Suppes and Zinnes (1963).
Proof. ‘⇒’: Assume that Λ(EF) is strongly invariant. For scale 〈E,F,µ〉, construct A so that
A  Πscale and A|EE = E and A|FF = F. Now assume that ΛA|EF f EF is true for 〈E,F,µ〉
and ψ is an admissible transformation for 〈E,F,µ〉. Then A  Λ(EF) and by assumption,
for any admissible ϕ relative to A, A[ f /ϕ( f A)]  Λ(EF), and thus ΛA[ f /ϕ( f A)]|EF f EF is true
for the scale 〈E,F,µ〉. Now, ψ is admissible relative to E, F, and µ only if ψ f A| |E|
fulfills equations 3. And then some extension ϕ of ψ with ϕ( f A)| |E| = ψ f A| |E| is
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admissible relative to A, for which Λ(A|EF f EF)[ f /ψ(µ)] = ΛA[ f /ϕ( f A)]|EF f EF . Therefore,
Λ(A|EF f EF)[ f /ψ(µ)] is true for any admissible transformation ψ relative to E, F, and µ. By
an analogous proof, ΛA|EF f EF is false for 〈E,F,µ〉 only if Λ(A|EF f EF)[ f /ψ(µ)] is false for any
admissible transformation ψ.
‘⇐’: Assume that ΛA|EF f EF is meaningful. Now assume that A  Πscale, A  Λ(EF)
and ϕ is an admissible transformation relative to A. Then ΛA|EF f EF is true for scale
〈E,F,µ〉 with E= A|EE and F= A|FF , and by assumption, so is ΛA|EF f EF [ f /ψ(µ)] for any
admissible transformation ψ relative to E, F, and µ. Now, ϕ is admissible relative to A
only if ϕ( f A)| |E| fulfills equations 3 and thus is admissible relative to E, F, and µ. Thus
ΛA|EF f EF [ f /ϕ( f A)] = ΛA[ f /ϕ( f A)]|EF f EF is true in 〈E,F,µ〉, and hence A[ f /ϕ( f A)]  Λ(EF)
for any admissible transformation ϕ relative to A. By an analogous proof, A 6 Λ(EF) only if
A[ f /ϕ( f A)] 6 Λ(EF) for any admissible transformation ϕ.
Admissible transformations are defined relative to the observations and the analytic
sentences Π. Strong invariance avoids the dependence on specific observations by a
universal quantification over all possible observations, and is therefore defined relative to
the set of admissible transformations and thus relative to the analytic sentences. Strong
invariance is thus a symmetry relative to the analytic sentences.
Now Przełe˛cki’s result can be generalized:
Claim 16. Assume V =A , O = E andΠ =Πscale. Then a set Λ of EF f -sentences is strongly
invariant iff Λ is about observation.
Proof. ‘⇐’: First, note that for any A Πscale and any admissible transformation ϕ relative
to A, there is someB Πscale withB|O = A|O such thatB|O ∪{ f } = A[ f /ϕ( f A)]|O ∪{ f }
(∗), which can be shown as follows: By definition 21, A[ f /ϕ( f A)]  Πscale, and since
f 6∈ O , A[ f /ϕ( f A)]|O = A|O . Then choose B := A[ f /ϕ( f A)].
Now assume that for any A,B Πscale withB|O = A|O , A  Λ iffB  Λ. Let C Πscale
and ϕ be admissible relative to C. Then, because of (∗), there is some D  Πscale with
D|O = C|O and D= C[ f /ϕ( f C)]. Therefore, by assumption, C[ f /ϕ( f C)]  Λ iff C  Λ.
‘⇒’: First, note that for any A,B Πscale withB|O = A|O , there is some transformation
ϕ admissible relative to A such that B|O ∪ { f } is isomorphic to A[ f /ϕ( f A)]|O ∪ { f } (∗∗),
which can be shown as follows: Since A|F is isomorphic to B|F , assume without loss
of generality that A|F = B|F . Now choose ϕ(µ) = f B for any function µ. Then ϕ is
admissible relative to A because A[ f /ϕ( f A)] =B Πadeq.
Now assume that B|O = A|O and B  Πscale. By (∗∗), there is some admissible ϕ
such that B|EF f = A[ f /ϕ( f A)]|EF f . Therefore, if Λ is strongly invariant, B  Λ iff
A  Λ.
Like strong invariance, strong O -determinacy is thus a symmetry relative to the analytic
sentences Π.
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To arrive at a syntactic version of strong O -determinacy, it is helpful to look at the
line of reasoning that led to definition 11. There, a set of sentences is taken to be about
observation if and only if its truth value is identical in any two worlds that are exactly
alike so far as observation is concerned. In connection with definitions 1 and 2, I described
the difference between semantic and syntactic criteria as that between isomorphism
and syntactic equivalence of observational structures, which is borne out by claim 3 for
falsifiability and claim 11 for verifiability. To arrive at an analogous relation for strong
O -determinacy, I thus suggest
Definition 23. A set Γ of V -sentences determines a set Λ of V -sentences if and only if
Γ ∪Π  Λ or Γ ∪Λ∪Π ⊥.
Definition 24. A set Ω of O -sentences is maximal if and only if for every O -sentence ω,
Ω ∪Π ω or Ω ∪Π  ¬ω.
Then one can formulate
Definition 25. A set Ω of V -sentences is strongly syntactically O -determined if and only if
it is determined by every possible and maximal set of O -sentences.
As in the case of falsifiability and verifiability, the difference between syntactic and
semantic strong O -determinacy is that between isomorphy and syntactical equivalence:
Claim 17. A set Λ of V -sentences is strongly syntactically O -determined iff for any V -
structures A,B Π with A|O ≡B|O , it holds that A  Λ iff B  Λ.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Let A,B Π and A|O ≡B|O . Then A,B  Th(B|O ) =: Ω. Ω is maximal and
possible, thus, by assumption, Ω ∪Π  Λ or Ω ∪ Λ ∪Π  ⊥. Thus A  Λ if and only if
B  Λ.
‘⇐’: Assume Ω is possible and maximal. Then for any A,B  Ω ∪Π, A|O ≡ B|O .
Therefore, by assumption, A  Λ iff B  Λ and thus either all A  Ω ∪Π are models of Λ
or none is. Thus Ω ∪Π  Λ or Ω ∪Λ∪Π ⊥.
This entails
Claim 18. If a set Λ of V -sentences is strongly syntactically O -determined, then Λ is strongly
semantically O -determined.
Proof. From claims 13 and 17 because B|O =B|O only if A|O ≡B|O .
The relation of strong O -determinacy to falsifiability and verifiability is given by
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Claim 19. Let Λ be a set of strongly syntactically (semantically) O -determined V -sentences.
Then Λ is syntactically (semantically) falsifiable/verifiable iff Λ is not analytically true/false.9
Proof. ‘⇒’: Immediate.
‘⇐’: Assume Π 6 Λ. Then for some A, A  Π and A 6 Λ. If Λ is syntactically O -
determined, then Th(A|O )∪Λ∪Π ⊥ because Th(A|O )∪Π 6 Λ. Thus Th(A|O ) falsifies
Λ. If Λ is semantically O -determined, then for all B  Π with B|O = A|O , B 6 Λ. Thus
A|O falsifies Λ.
The proofs for verifiability are analogous.
7 Weak O -determinacy
Since Przełe˛cki considers strong semantic O -determinacy too exclusive, he suggests a
straightforward weakening of definition 19:
Definition 26. A set Λ of V -sentence is weakly semantically O -determined if and only if it
is determined by a possible O -structure.
The motivation for the criterion is clear: The truth value of a strongly semantically
O -determined sentence is fixed for any O -structure, but there are many sentences whose
truth values are fixed only for some structures. Przełe˛cki considers this enough to be
empirically significant.
A connection to ordinary language can be found again starting from Lewis’s notion of
sentences about observation. The idea to take a sentence to be partially about observation
if it partially supervenes on observation leads Lewis (1988b, §X) to a probabilistic notion
of empirical significance, but I want to argue that his justification more plausibly leads to
weak semantic O -determinacy. Lewis (1988b, 149) argues that
a statement is partly about a subject matter iff its truth value partially super-
venes, in a suitably non-trivial way, on that subject matter. Let us say that the
truth value of a statement supervenes on subject matter M within class X of
worlds iff, whenever two worlds in X are M -equivalent, they give the statement
the same truth value. [ . . . ] Supervenience within a [subclass X of all] worlds
is partial supervenience.
Lewis needs the restriction to “suitable partial supervenience” to avoid trivialization,
because if, say, it is possible for X to contain only one world, then any sentence α partially
9Here and in the following definitions and claims, choosing uniformly the first, second, etc. of the n phrases
connected by slashes ‘/’ leads to one of n conjuncts of the definition or claim. In this claim, for example, Λ is
falsifiable iff it is not analytically true, and Λ is verifiable iff it is not analytically false. Analogously, uniformly
substituting a phrase by the parenthetical one following it leads to another conjunct of the definition or claim.
Claim 19 therefore has four conjuncts.
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supervenes on any M . To exclude such classes, Lewis demands that X contain a majority
of the worlds in which α is true and a majority of the worlds in which α is false. To
explicate the notion of ‘majority’ for worlds, he assumes that there is a suitable probability
distribution over possible worlds and states that the condition is satisfied iff P(X |α)> 1
2
and
P(X |¬α)> 1
2
. Under some additional assumptions, the notion of partial supervenience that
results is equivalent to the standard probabilistic criterion that α is empirically significant
iff P(α|ω) 6= P(α) for some observational sentence ω.
Lewis’s notion of partial supervenience need not lead to a probabilistic criterion of
empirical significance. He introduces the majority condition to avoid trivialization, but there
is nothing in the concept of ‘partial supervenience’ itself that suggests the supervenience
has to hold for the majority of α worlds and ¬α worlds. It is much more in keeping with the
goal of explicating empirical significance to place only observational restrictions on X . The
minimal requirement is thus that X be closed under observational equivalence, such that
for any world that is in X , every O -equivalent world is also in X . This condition already
avoids trivialization, and furthermore does not lead to complications when statements
are taken to be expressed by sets of sentences, which are not easily negated. To partially
supervene on observation, Λ thus has to be assigned the same truth value by all members
of a set X closed under observational equivalence.
Definition 27. A set Λ of V -sentences partly supervenes on observation if and only if there
is some non-empty set X of possible V -structures such that for any A ∈ X , all B Π with
B|O = A|O are in X , and for any A,B ∈ X with A|O =B|O , B  Λ iff A  Λ.
As announced, this is the same as weak semantic O -determinacy:
Claim 20. A set Λ of V -sentences is weakly semantically O -determined iff Λ partly supervenes
on observation.
Proof. If AO is possible and determines Λ, choose X as the set of possible expansions of AO .
If Λ partly supervenes on observation, then any A|O with A ∈ X is possible and determines
Λ.
Przełe˛cki (1974a, 347) points out that under his assumption that ΠT is O -conservative
with respect to ΠO , definition 26 has a very conspicuous formulation: A V -sentence α is
weakly semantically O -determined iff {α} ∪ΠT or {¬α} ∪ΠT is semantically O -creative
with respect to ΠO . Because sets of sentences are not easily negated, this formulation is
neither as general nor as conspicuous as
Claim 21. A set Λ of V -sentences is weakly semantically O -determined iff Λ is semantically
verifiable or semantically falsifiable.
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Proof. Assume Λ is semantically verifiable or semantically falsifiable. This holds iff there is
a possible AO such that Λ is true in all structures B Π with B|O = AO or false in all of
them, that is, Λ has the same truth value in all of these structures. This is equivalent to Λ
being weakly semantically O -determined.
With claims 5 and 8, this means that a sentence α is weakly semantically O -determined
iff α or ¬α is semantically O -creative with respect to Π. This is Przełe˛cki’s claim, reformu-
lated using the generalized definition of O -conservativeness (see appendix A).
Considerations analogous to those leading to the definition of strong syntactic O -
determinacy lead to
Definition 28. A set Λ of V -sentences is weakly syntactically O -determined if and only if it
is determined by some possible and maximal set of O -sentences.
This definition relates to that of weak semantic O -determinacy in the usual way:
Claim 22. A set Λ of V -sentences is weakly syntactically O -determined iff there is some
O -structure AO such that for all structures B,C  Π with B|O ≡ C|O ≡ AO , it holds that
B  Λ iff C  Λ.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Choose Ω := Th(AO ) and proceed as in the proof of claim 17.
‘⇐’: Choose some AO  Ω and proceed as in the proof of claim 17
And analogously to the semantic case, the following holds:
Claim 23. A set Λ of V -sentences is weakly syntactically O -determined iff Λ is syntactically
verifiable or syntactically falsifiable.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Immediate.
‘⇐’: If Ω verifies or falsifies Λ, Ω is possible. Thus Ω ∪Π can be extended to a possible
and maximal set of O -sentences.
As the disjunction of falsifiability and verifiability, weak syntactic O -determinacy has
occurred often in the history of philosophy, albeit repeatedly sailing under false colors. The
illicit reflagging often occurred with the help of the prediction criterion of confirmation.
For example, Carnap (1936, 435) calls the confirmation of a sentence S “directly reducible
to a class C of sentences” if “S is a consequence of a finite subclass of C” (complete
reducibility of confirmation) or “if the confirmation of S is not completely reducible to that
of C but if there is an infinite subclass C ′ of C such that the sentences of C ′ are mutually
independent and are consequences of S” (direct incomplete reducibility of confirmation).
This definition is the first in a long chain that eventually leads to the requirement of
confirmability, which “suffices as a formulation of the principle of empiricism” (Carnap
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1937, 35). Carnap’s terminology makes it clear that, like Ayer, he assumes the prediction
criterion of confirmation (see also Gemes 1998, §1.4).
Following the chain of definitions is tedious,10 but significantly simplified when taking
into account that it becomes trivial with the next link: Carnap (1936, 435) calls the
confirmation of S
reducible to that of [a class of sentences] C , if there is a finite series of classes
C1, C2, . . . , Cn such that the relation of directly reducible confirmation subsists
1) between S and C1, 2) between every sentence of Ci and Ci+1 (i = 1 to n−1),
and 3) between every sentence of Cn and C .
For the trivialization proof, assume that C allows the direct incomplete reducibility of at
least one sentence γ. For any sentence α, if γ is directly incompletely reducible to Ω, so is
γ∧α, which can therefore be in C1. Then α can be completely reduced to C1 := {γ∧α}
because {γ∧α}  α and {γ∧α} is a finite subset of itself. Thus the confirmation of α is
directly reducible to C1, whose confirmation is directly reducible to C , and therefore the
confirmation of α is reducible to C .
Now, the confirmation of S is reducible to a class of O -predicates if the confirmation
of S “is reducible [ . . . ] to a not contravalid sub-class of the class which contains the full
sentences of the predicates of [O ] and the negations of these sentences” (Carnap 1936,
435f); call such a sub-class a confirmation class. Full sentences are atomic sentences, and a
contravalid sentence is incompatible with the laws of nature (Carnap 1936, 432–434).11
Thus if some confirmation class Ω allows the direct incomplete reducibility of at least one
sentence γ, the confirmation of α is reducible to O . In that case α is also confirmable,
because a “sentence S is called confirmable [ . . . ] if the confirmation of S is reducible [ . . . ]
to that of a class of observable predicates” (Carnap 1936, 456). Since nothing was assumed
about α, the principle of empiricism is then met by any sentence whatsoever.
The triviality of Carnap’s general notion of reducibility leaves the direct reducibility of
S to full sentences of O as the concept of confirmability, and this is just the disjunction of
falsifiability and verifiability restricted to a special class of O -sentences.
As shown above, Ayer’s only non-trivial criterion of empirical significance is essentially
equivalent to falsifiability. But in his first informal description of empirical significance,
falsifiability and verifiability are on a par. Ayer (1936, 35) writes:
We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only
if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express—that is,
if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to
accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.
10That this holds for most definitions in the article may explain why, as far as I know, no concept introduced
in “Testability and Meaning” besides that of reduction sentences has been used since.
11I will discuss the relevance of contravalidity in §9.2.
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Since Ayer (1936, 37f) rejects the idea that a sentence can be conclusively verified or
falsified, he suggests his first definition of verifiability as a “weaker sense of verification”,
thereby implicitly assuming the prediction criterion of confirmation.
In an early work, Carnap (1928, 327f) avoids the prediction criterion by leaving the
concept of confirmation undefined. He writes:
If a statement p expresses the content of an experience E, and if the statement
q is either the same as p or can be derived from p and prior experiences, either
through deductive or inductive arguments, then we say that q is “supported
by” the experience E. [ . . . ] A statement p is said to have “factual content”,
if experiences which would support p or the contradictory of p are at least
conceivable, and if their characteristics can be indicated.
Carnap’s examples indicate that quantified O -sentences describe conceivable experiences,
so that in my terminology, Carnap considers a sentence to have factual content if and only
if it is verifiable, falsifiable, confirmable or disconfirmable. Questions of confirmation are
outside the scope of this article, so that, as far as this article is concerned, Carnap suggests
to consider a sentence empirically significant if and only if it is weakly O -determined.
In a defense of criteria of empirical significance against the critique by Hempel (1950),
Rynin (1957, 53) also suggests that a sentence be taken as significant if and only if it is
either verifiable or falsifiable. For Rynin (1957, 51), this
might constitute a kind of axiom of semantics, or at any rate some sort of
adequacy requirement for a definition of “meaningful statement”; I at any
rate should consider it as self-evident that for a statement to be cognitively
meaningful it must be possible for it to be true or false, that it have conditions
of truth or falsity, hence necessary or sufficient truth conditions.
Of course, much in the quote hinges on these “conditions of truth or falsity”. In his criterion,
Rynin speaks of “ascertainable” truth conditions, and when discussing Hempel’s critique of
criteria of empirical significance, he notes that
instead of talking of truth conditions [Hempel] prefers to formulate the verifia-
bility principle in terms of relationships holding between the statements whose
meaning is in question and what he calls “observation sentences”, which I think
it fair to treat as true statements affirming the occurrence of ascertainable
states of affairs.—This difference in manner of formulation seems to me to be
non-essential.
Apart from its restriction to molecular observational sentences, Rynin’s criterion is therefore
equivalent to weak syntactic O -determinacy.
Let me conclude this section with a puzzling observation that suggests that Hempel
was not overly diligent in his dismissal of the search for a criterion of empirical significance.
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Figure 1: Relations between the syntactic definitions. The equivalence holds for direct verifiability and the
negation of sets of sentences whenever the concepts are defined. A strongly O -determined set of sentences is
also weakly O -determined even if not analytically contingent. Criteria of empirical significance typically also
require that a set of sentences be analytically contingent.
As mentioned above, Hempel (1965c, 122) considers the conjunction of falsifiability and
verifiability as a criterion of empirical significance because it is symmetric under negation,
but dismisses it as being too exclusive. Surprisingly, he discusses Rynin’s article without
mentioning Rynin’s criterion, which is symmetric under negation and more inclusive than
both falsifiability and verifiability.
8 Import of the relations
Using the definitions above, one arrives at the notable number of equivalences and entail-
ment relations shown in figures 1 and 2, with strong and weak O -determinacy, falsifiability,
and verifiability as the four major criteria of empirical significance. With this overview, it is
now easy to consider the implications of the entailment relations and equivalences.
8.1 Six comparative concepts of empirical significance
The entailment relations between the criteria show that there can be stronger and weaker
criteria of empirical significance, and suggest that there may be criteria of comparative
empirical significance. Hempel (1965b, 117) similarly states that “cognitive significance in
a system is a matter of degree”. He sees this as a reason to dispose of the concept altogether,
and “instead of dichotomizing this array [of systems] into significant and non-significant
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Figure 2: Relations between the semantic definitions. The equivalence holds for strong invariance, empirical
content, and the negation of sets of sentences whenever the concepts are defined. A strongly O -determined set
of sentences is also weakly O -determined even if not analytically contingent. Each of the nodes is entailed
by its syntactic counterpart from figure 1. Criteria of empirical significance typically also demand that set of
sentences be analytically contingent.
systems” to compare systems of sentences by their precision, systematicity, simplicity,
and level of confirmation. But this conclusion is unwarranted. For one, it is not clear
what Hempel means when he states that cognitive significance “is a matter of degree”. If
cognitive significance is an explicatum, then it is whatever one decides it to be. If it is an
explicandum, then deviating from it is not problematic. Perhaps Hempel intends to say that
the best explicatum is one in which cognitive significance is a matter of degree, presumably
because any dichotomy must be arbitrary. But this means that there is an explicatum,
only it is not a classificatory one. This is nothing to be ashamed of, for Hempel (1952,
§10) himself has argued that the move from a classificatory to a comparative concept is
often a sign of an investigation’s maturity (see also Hempel and Oppenheim 1936), as the
explication of ‘warm’ by ‘higher temperature than’ illustrates (Carnap 1950, §4, Hempel
1952, §10).
As the split of strong and weak O -determinacy into falsifiability and verifiability shows,
a comparative explicatum for empirical significance will probably have to be partial, in
that not all criteria can be compared with respect to their inclusiveness without further
assumptions. Therefore I suggest
Definition 29. A set Λ of V -sentences is at least as syntactically (semantically) falsifiable/
verifiable/O -determined as a set Γ of V -sentences if and only if every possible set of
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O -sentences (possible O -structure) that falsifies/verifies/O -determines Γ also falsifies/
verifies/O -determines Λ.
The partial order of the subset relation transfers to ‘being at least as falsifiable/
verifiable/O -determined’, in both its syntactic and its semantic guise, for each set Π
of analytic sentences. ‘At least as syntactically falsifiable’ is called ‘falsifiability of at least
as high a degree’ by Popper (1935, §33), who also notes that this order is partial (Popper
1935, §34).
There is a second reason why Hempel should not have dismissed the search for criteria
of empirical significance so easily. For each set Π, each relation in definition 8.1 has natural
greatest and, more importantly, least elements.
Claim 24. A set Λ of V -sentences is analytically false/analytically true/analytically false
or analytically true if and only if Λ is at least as syntactically (semantically) falsifiable/
syntactically (semantically) verifiable/syntactically O -determined as any other set of V -
sentences.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Immediate.
‘⇐’: If Λ is not analytically false, it is not syntactically (semantically) at least as
falsifiable as ⊥. Analogously for verifiability and >.
If Λ is neither analytically false nor analytically true, there are a structure A Π ∪Λ
and a structure B  Π with B 6 Λ. Choose Γ := Ω := Th(A|O ) ∩ Th(B|O ). Then Ω
determines Γ but not Λ.
This shows that the comparative notions connect fruitfully to analyticity.
Strong semantic O -determinacy connects very straightforwardly to ‘semantically more
determinate than’, because all and only sets of sentences semantically determined by every
O -structure are at least as semantically O -determined as any other:
Claim 25. A set Λ of V -sentences is strongly semantically O -determined if and only if Λ is at
least as semantically O -determined as any other set of V -sentences.
Falsifiability, verifiability, and weak O -determinacy are immediately connected to their
comparative counterparts:
Claim 26. A set Λ of V -sentences is not syntactically (semantically) falsifiable/verifiable/
weakly O -determined if and only if Λ is at most as syntactically (semantically) falsifiable/
verifiable/O -determined as any other V -sentence.
Proof. The claim holds for all criteria because only the empty set is a subset of every
set.
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So the sentences that are not empirically significant according to the classical, classifi-
catory criteria are the least elements of the criteria’s comparative analogues.
Therefore, even if Hempel is correct that empirical significance is a matter of degree, his
conclusion that there cannot be an explicatum at all fails in two respects. First, empirical
significance can be explicated by comparative concepts. Second, these comparative concepts
have non-arbitrary least elements, so there is a natural way to dichotomize the array of
sets of sentences into empirically significant and not empirically significant.
8.2 The justifications of the criteria
Many of the circumscriptions of the explicandum and methodological presumptions dis-
cussed in the preliminaries provide arguments for the feasibility of a criterion of empirical
significance. The relations between the criteria suggest that the criteria are already to a
certain extent adequate.
For one, the equivalences of many of the criteria to falsifiability, verifiability, or O -
determinacy help to counter the charge of arbitrariness that Lewis (1988b, 127) and,
presumably, Hempel (1965b, §4) have put forth. They suggest that the explicated notions
are robust under a change of formalism from predicate logic to model theory to set theory,
and a change of formulation within each formalism. This provides an argument analogous
to (though less spectacular than) that for the successful explication of ‘computability’,
in which the equivalence of different definitions is cited as evidence for their adequacy
(Barker-Plummer 2009, Copeland 2008).
The equivalences also show that especially Lewis’s charge, that many criteria of em-
pirical significance have strayed too far from the intuitive explicandum, does not apply
to the criteria discussed here: Strong semantic O -determinacy is equivalent to aboutness,
semantic falsifiability is equivalent to partial aboutness of content, and weak semantic
O -determinacy is arguable equivalent to partial supervenience, all of which are meant
to capture the ordinary language notion. And although verifiability is not equivalent to
any of Lewis’s criteria, it occurs with falsifiability in the disjunction that makes up weak
O -determinacy (claim 23). It is thus at least the link connecting two different notions of
partial aboutness.
The close connection of the criteria to ordinary language may prompt another criticism:
that the criteria are of little use in the sciences, the way the ordinary language notion of
‘fish’, which includes the likes of whales and dolphins, is of little use in biology (Carnap
1950, §3). If the sciences are taken to include mathematics, then the equivalence of
falsifiability to O -conservativeness already provide a rebuttal, for the notion of definition is
essential in mathematics, and O -conservativeness is essential for the notion of definition
(Belnap 1993). At least for sentences, claim 9 shows the relevance of verifiability by
its connection to falsifiability through the negation of sentences, and claim 23 shows
the relevance of weak O -determinacy by its connection to both criteria through their
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disjunction. Lest one argue that it is only falsifiability that is really needed, I provide
the following appeal to authority: Church (1949) only proofs that every sentence or its
negation is empirically significant according to Ayer’s criterion of indirect verifiability, and
this result was considered important in the philosophical community. If such a proof were
possible for falsifiability, it would, because of claims 9 and 23, show that every sentence is
weakly O -determinate. Thus O -determinacy has been considered closely enough related to
falsifiability that the triviality of the one suggests the triviality of the other.
Without relying on the importance of mathematics, one can argue that definitions are
similarly important in the natural sciences. Additionally, claim 14 and claims 15 and 16
show that at least strong O -determinacy is important for the concepts of measurement
because it generalizes strong invariance. Its close relation to weak O -determinacy suggests
that the latter criterion is important within measurement theory as well, in effect stating
that a numerical statement is weakly O -determinate if and only if its truth value is for
some observations invariant under the admissible transformations (cf. Przełe˛cki 1974a,
350). Similarly, one may demand that the statement be false or be true for all admissible
transformations, thus arriving at a special case of falsifiability or verifiability in terms of
admissible transformations and thus measurements.
Conversely, the equivalence to a special case of strong O -determinacy protects strong
invariance against the charge that it is ad-hoc. There is always the possibility to be mislead
by the special conditions of a context, in this case the features of measurements, but
the equivalence shows that strong invariance is a special case of a much more generally
motivated criterion.
There is also the more general charge of irrelevance. For even if a criterion is close to
some intuitive notion and a generalization of some concept defined for scientific application,
the intuitive notion and the scientific concept may be applicable in their domain but
irrelevant. Such a charge becomes more difficult to sustain the more concepts rely on or
connect to the criterion. The relations shown in figures 1 and 2 suggest what would be
irrelevant as well if the criteria discussed here were irrelevant, and it is doubtful that the
notion of meaningfulness in measurement, the notion of empirical content as explicated by
the Ramsey sentence, and the notions of aboutness and partial aboutness are all of no use.
Finally, there is what Gemes (1998, §1.1) has called “the problem of past failures”.
The failure of Ayer’s first criterion and subsequent amendments, the argument goes, is a
good basis to inductively conclude that future criteria will be failures, too. I have already
noted that not all criteria have been shown to be trivial, and the equivalences between
the criteria discussed here make it easy to show that none of them is trivial: Assume
O = {O, o}, T = {P,Q, b}, and Π = {∀x[Ox ↔ ¬P x], a = o}. Then Pa is empirically
significant according to all the criteria, and Qb is not. It is also notable that none of the
criteria are amendments of Ayer’s criteria (direct verifiability being only the first half of
Ayer’s second criterion). The induction on past failures therefore does not obviously apply.
The equivalences also provide a positive justification rather than a defense, because
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now the arguments in favor of each individual formulation turn out to be arguments for the
same criterion. Thus Przełe˛cki’s general argument and Suppes’s measure theory-specific
argument already lead to strong O -determinacy, and Lewis’s argument for aboutness adds
additional support. Lewis’s analysis of the term ‘partly’ also provides a justification for
the differences between the major criteria: The underlying explicandum is ambiguous
because ‘partly about observation’ is ambiguous. Falsifiability is accordingly supported by
one specific disambiguation of ‘partly about observation’, but also by Ayer’s and Popper’s
arguments, and finally by the arguments in favor of the Ramsey sentence as explication
of ‘empirical content’. My modification of Lewis’s analysis of partial supervenience and
Przełe˛cki’s argument for weak O -determinacy also support the same criterion. Verifiability,
while historically not often defended by itself, again receives some justification through its
role in weak O -determinacy.
Furthermore, the relations between the criteria suggest that the criteria fulfill Carnap’s
desiderata for explications (§2.1). They are certainly more precise than the phrase ‘empiri-
cally meaningful’, and some of the formulations are fairly simple—at least, they are not
“page-long”, as Lewis (1988a, 127) feared. In fact, the equivalences allow the application
of different formulations according to expedience. The equivalences to Lewis’s ordinary
language notions suggest that the criteria are similar to their explicandum “in such a
way that, in most cases in which the explicandum has been used, the explicatum can be
used”.12 I have also suggested to use conditions of adequacy instead of Carnap’s demand
for fruitfulness, or, lacking conditions of adequacy, use as a proxy Hempel’s demand that
the desideratum allow developing a comprehensive and sound theoretical system. The
relations between the comparative and classificatory notions of empirical significance
(claims 24 and 26) and the relations listed above to counter the charge of irrelevance are
steps in that direction. The following section provides more evidence that the criteria allow
the development of a comprehensive theoretical system, for it shows how they can be
generalized with comparative ease.
9 Generalizations
The presumptions of the semantic criteria of empirical significance are comparably strong:
They assume predicate logic, a bipartition of the vocabulary and a set Π containing only
analytic sentences. As already noted, the syntactic criteria of empirical significance can be
defined with any distinguished set of observational sentences, and the equivalence proofs
12I actually think that this demand is problematic because it suggests that there is something sacred about
the current usage of a term, as Laudan (1986, 120) has argued: More than half of current uses must be
captured. Rather, I would suggest that the current use of the term only provide some conditions of adequacy.
Here, I rely on Lewis’s ordinary language intuitions as a proxy, with the hope that an explicatum that fits
with the ordinary language intuitions is likely to meet the conditions of adequacy that one would place on an
explicatum.
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at most rely on the set being closed under truthfunctional composition. At least falsifiability
is furthermore already generalized to all systems of logic in which conservativeness is
defined. In the following, I will suggest two further generalizations by weakening the
restrictions on the observations and the restrictions on Π.
9.1 General observational sentences and structures
Many classical syntactic criteria allow only finite sets of molecular or atomic O -sentences
to falsify or verify a V -sentence (Popper 1935, Hempel 1965b, Rynin 1957). Since there
may be infinitely many non-equivalent observation sentences, this restriction cannot be
captured by restricting the set of observation sentences. To accommodate this restriction
and others, I suggest to consider a set of sentences one of observation sentences if and only
if it is in Ω, where Ω can be determined as needed. Any element of Ω will be called ‘set of
Ω-sentences’. This allows the following
Definition 30. A set Λ of V -sentences is syntactically falsifiable/verifiable/weakly deter-
mined in Ω if and only if there is a possible set of Ω-sentences that falsifies/verifies/
determines Λ.
If Ω contains all sets of O -sentences, definition 30 is equivalent to the conjunction of
definitions 4, 15, and 25.
To achieve a similar versatile definition for semantic criteria of empirical significance, I
suggest to use a set Ω of sets of structures. Elements of Ω will be called ‘sets of Ω-structures’.
Whether Ω contains sets of structures or sets of sentences will be clear from context. For
sets of Ω-structures, the subset-relation is the analogue of the entailment relation for sets of
sentences. In analogy to the compatibility of a set of sentences with Π, a set of V -structures
is possible if and only if its intersection with the models of Π is not empty. In other words,
a set of V -structures is possible if and only if one of its elements is possible according to
definition 2. To define this notion also for structures of proper subsets of V , I suggest
Definition 31. The possible subset of a set of structures Γ is the set of possible structures
in Γ . Γ is possible if and only if its possible subset is not empty.
This leads, in analogy to definitions 9, 16, and 18 to
Definition 32. A set of structures determines (falsifies/verifies) a set Λ of V -sentences in Ω
if and only if all elements A and B (A) of its possible subset are such that A  Λ iff B  Λ
(A  Λ / A 6 Λ).
Finally, this suggests in analogy to definitions 10, 17, and 26
Definition 33. A set Λ of V -sentences is semantically falsifiable/verifiable/weakly deter-
mined in Ω if and only if there is a possible set of Ω-structures that falsifies/verifies/
determines Λ.
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If Ω contains all sets of O -structures, definition 33 is equivalent to the conjunction of
definitions 10, 17, and 26.
It is also possible to define a generalization of strong O -determinacy:
Definition 34. A set Ω of Ω-sentences (Ω-structures) is maximal if and only if there is
no possible set Γ of Ω-sentences (Ω-structures) such that Γ ∪Π  Ω and Ω ∪Π 6 Γ (the
possible subset of Γ is a proper subset of the possible subset of Ω).
If Ω contains all sets of O -sentences, this definition is equivalent to definition 24.
As a generalization of definitions 19 and 25, I thus suggest
Definition 35. A set Λ of V -sentences is strongly semantically (syntactically) determined
in Ω if and only if it is determined by every possible maximal set of Ω-sentences (Ω-
structures).
If Ω contains all sets of O -sentences, this definition is equivalent to definition 25. If Ω
contains all singleton sets of O -structures, this definition is equivalent to definition 19.
Based on these concepts, one can construct generalized notions of comparative deter-
minacy, falsifiability, and verifiability:
Definition 36. A set Λ of V -sentences is syntactically (semantically) at least as falsifiable/
verifiable/determined in Ω as a set Γ of V -sentences if and only if every possible set of
Ω-sentences (Ω-structures) that falsifies/verifies/determines Γ in Ω also falsifies/verifies/
determines Λ in Ω.
Since Ω is not further determined, it is only possible to proof a simple weak analogy to
claim 24:
Claim 27. If a set Λ of V -sentences is analytically false/analytically true/analytically false
or analytically true, then Λ is at least as syntactically (semantically) falsifiable/verifiable/
determined in Ω as any other set of V -sentences.
In complete analogy to claim 26, the following holds:
Claim 28. A set Λ of V -sentences is not syntactically (semantically) falsifiable/verifiable/
weakly determined in Ω if and only if Λ is at most as syntactically (semantically) falsifiable/
verifiable/determined in Ω as any other set of V -sentences.
Proof. The claim holds for all criteria because only the empty set is a subset of every
set.
Claims 27 and 28 show that the generalized comparative concepts, in partial analogy
to the more specific ones, relate fruitfully to their classificatory counterparts. An exception
is the notion of strong semantic determinacy in Ω. Unlike strong semantic O -determinacy,
but like strong syntactic O -determinacy, it does not identify the greatest elements of
its comparative counterpart. Thus the generalizations of strong syntactic and semantic
O -determinacy bring the concepts closer together.
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9.2 General background assumptions
With reference to Duhem (1914), Sober (2007, 5) notes that scientific theories, “on their
own, do not make testable predictions. One needs to add ‘auxiliary propositions’ to the
theories one wishes to test”. Typically, these auxiliary sentences are not taken to be just
analytic sentences, and therefore the above definitions would still exclude almost all
scientific theories even though the criteria are non-trivial. Gemes (1998, §1.2) calls this
“the challenge from holism” and points out that the logical empiricists were acutely aware
of it.13
One simple way to meet the challenge from holism is to consider the empirical signifi-
cance of the union of the theory and the auxiliary sentences. But this approach does not al-
ways allow to infer the empirical (non-)significance of a theory from the (non-)significance
of the theory and its auxiliary sentences. For a subset of a falsifiable or O -determined set
may itself not be falsifiable or O -determined, respectively, and a subset of a non-verifiable
or non-O -determined set may itself be verifiable or O -determined, respectively. This is
a problem because a criterion of empirical significance is meant to determine whether a
specific theory is significant, while this approach determines only the empirical significance
of huge sets of theories, possibly including most of science and everyday knowledge.
Ayer’s definition of indirect verifiability is an attempt at meeting this challenge from
holism in a different way, by defining empirical significance relative to a set Π containing
not only analytic sentences, but also other empirically significant sentences. This kind of
recursive definition is suggestive given its success in the theory of definitions, for if a term
P is definable in O -terms, then any term definable in O -terms and P is also definable in
O -terms alone, and if a set Λ of sentences is translatable into a set of O -sentences, then
any sentence translatable into a set of sentences containing only O -terms and Λ is also
translatable into a set of O -sentences. For strong syntactic O -determinacy, such a recursion
works as well, because the truth value of an O -determined set Λ of sentences is a function
of the truth values of observational sentences, and thus, if the truth value of any set of
sentences is a function of the truth values of Λ and observational sentences, it is also a
function of the truth values of observational sentences alone. But for any of the weaker
criteria of empirical significance, this recursion breaks down.
The problem of past failures clearly does not allow the conclusion that all criteria
will fail. But the puncture-and-patch industry as summarized in §1 consists exclusively
of recursive criteria, most recursive criteria suggested so far are trivial, and no recursive
criterion has been shown to be non-trivial. The correct inference to draw from the problem
of past failures may thus be that there is no adequate recursive criterion of empirical
significance.
Another reason to question the search for a recursive criterion is that recursive criteria
13Gemes (1998, §2) attempts to solve this problem for Ayer-type criteria with his concept of natural
axiomatization.
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do not seem to address the challenge from holism. In a recursive criterion, the auxiliary
sentences can contain any empirically significant sentence, even those that are known to be
false. But the challenge from holism consists in the need for other true (or at least justified)
sentences to evaluate a theory.
Surprisingly enough, there have been few justifications of the assumption that a cri-
terion of empirical significance should be recursive. In defense of his second criterion
of empirical significance, Ayer (1946, 12) states that only by taking auxiliary sentences
into account can “hypotheticals” be rendered empirically significant. But Ayer then simply
chooses empirically significant auxiliary sentences without even considering justified aux-
iliary sentences. As far as I know, this is the only justification that has been provided for
recursive criteria.
Sober (2008, 151, §2.14) suggests a criterion that uses justified auxiliary sentences. He
points to the triviality of Ayer’s first criterion and, with “some fear [of] stumbling into the
same old quagmire”, suggests instead:
Proposition P now has observational implications if and only if there exist
true auxiliary assumptions A, and an observation statement O, such that (i)
P&A entails O, but A by itself does not entail O, (ii) we now are justified in
believing A, and (iii) the justification we now have for believing A does not
depend on believing that P is true (or that it is false), and also does not depend
on believing that O is true (or that it is false).
Sober argues for the requirement that A be justified independently of O as follows. Let P
be any sentence, and O a justified true observational sentence. Then ¬P ∨O is true and
justified, and if the choice A := {¬P ∨O} were allowed by the definition, P would have
observational implications. In short, the criterion is trivial without the restriction.14
Sober’s trivialization argument is incomplete because he assumes, but does not prove,
that ¬P ∨O 6 O for some O. Lewis (1988a) notes that if ¬P ∨O  O for all O, then P is
a logical truth. Hence the restriction on A is justified under the assumption that not only
logical truths should lack observational implications. The argument is also no strict proof
as long as ‘justification’ and ‘dependence of a justification’ are not defined. Whether it is
valid depends on whether, for example, O justifies ¬P ∨O independently of ¬O, P, and ¬P
for any P.
More problematic is that the criterion itself is arguably trivial: For, assume that P
is any sentence and Q a true non-observational sentence that entails O and is justified
independently of O, ¬O, P, and ¬P. Then, in analogy to Sober’s trivialization argument,
A := {¬P ∨Q} is allowed by his definition, and thus, unless it is logically true, P has obser-
vational implications. Unlike Sober’s trivialization argument, this argument assumes that
14Sober (2008, 144f) provides a trivialization argument for the case that A depends on P only for his
explication of ‘P is testable against Q’, so its relevance for the definition at hand is not immediately clear.
Furthermore, there are reasons to assume that the argument fails (Lutz 2010b).
39
Sebastian Lutz Criteria of Empirical Significance: A Success Story—Draft: 2010–12–11
the justification for a sentence does not always have to depend on all of the observational
sentences it entails, but this is a rather weak assumption about justification.
Sober’s and my trivialization arguments rely on the same trick: Some sentence (O
or Q) is used to infer another (¬P ∨ O or ¬P ∨ Q) by irrelevant disjunction, but only
the inferred sentence is included in A. One way of avoiding this specific trivialization is
to disallow irrelevant disjunctions, for example by restricting justificatory inferences to
relevant deductions as developed by Schurz (1991). I will suggest another way that is
more suitable to the current case, starting from an observation that Schurz (1991, §2.2,
parenthetical remark in the original) makes in his justification of relevant deduction. He
notes that if one knows that A and tells someone else that A∨ B, one misleads the hearer
because
in practical speech situations the hearer assumes that if the speaker tells him
a disjunction, say A∨ B, then the speaker’s knowledge Ks about A and B is
indeed incomplete, i. e. both ¬A and ¬B and thus also A and B are possible in
Ks [because, given Ks `L A∨ B, Ks 6`L A/B implies Ks 6`L ¬B/¬A, respectively].
[ . . . ] The irrelevant conclusion together with this implicit assumption causes
in the hearer an expectation which is not only irrelevant but wrong—
namely that it is possible that B. ‘`L’ here refers to deductive inference in predicate logic.
My suggestion is to avoid this wrong expectation by disallowing the speaker to tell the
hearer that A∨ B but not A, if he knows that A. If the speaker asserts auxiliary sentences Π,
this leads to
Definition 37. Π is an honest set if and only if every ϕ ∈Π is a justified sentence, and Π
also contains every sentence on which the justification of ϕ depends.
Somewhat less precisely, I will also speak of “honest auxiliary sentences” rather than
“honest sets of auxiliary sentences”. One might paraphrase this requirement on Π more
intuitively as the demand that Π contain all auxiliary sentences that are accepted, either
actually or in some counterfactual situation that is of interest. Note that an honest set
of auxiliary sentences can be finite, because analytic sentences do not need justifications,
and some sentences may be justified by entities that are not sentences (e. g. observations).
Coherentists may argue that the sentences in a finite set can justify each other without such
primitively justified sentences.
To avoid trivialization of Sober’s criterion, I therefore suggest the following modifica-
tion:
Definition 38. A set Λ of V -sentences has observational implications if and only if Λ is
O -creative with respect to an honest set containing all analytic sentences.
This is syntactic falsifiability, with Π taken to be an honest set of justified or analytic
sentences rather than just the set of analytic sentences. All other definitions discussed
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above, including the generalizations in §9.1, can be reinterpreted analogously. It is clear
that in the intuitive paraphrase of definition 37, the counterfactual case is important
because otherwise, an accepted theory could have no observational implications at all since
anything it entails would (I assume) be accepted and therefore in Π.
Sober’s definition and definition 38 differ beyond their restrictions on the auxiliary
sentences. Unlike Sober’s criterion, O -creativity is defined for set of sentences and includes
sets that only allow new inferences from infinite sets of observational sentences (in the
case of higher order logic). I do not think that Sober’s criterion was designed with this
distinction in mind, however, so this modification is only of a technical nature. Sober also
does not assume that observational sentences are determined by their vocabulary. But
as noted, this restriction can be accommodated in artificial languages, is not essential
for syntactic criteria, and is completely avoided in the generalizations in §9.1. Finally,
the definition does not include a reference to the current point in time, because time
dependence follows from the definition’s dependence on justified auxiliary sentences. Since
the set of justified auxiliary sentences changes over time, so does the set of sentences that
are O -creative with respect to them.
Ignoring these rather formal differences, definition 38 is at least as exclusive as Sober’s
definition: Condition (ii) is entailed by the demand that the auxiliary sentences form an
honest set. Condition (iii) for one excludes sentences P that are O -creative relative to
auxiliary sentences whose justification depends on P. In definition 38, those sentences lack
observational implications because they are already contained in the auxiliary sentences,
which therefore already entail everything that their conjunction with P entails. Condition
(iii) furthermore excludes sentences P that only entail observational sentences O on which
the justification of the auxiliary sentences depends. In definition 38, these observational
sentences are also contained in the auxiliary sentences, so that they are already entailed by
the auxiliary sentences alone. There is also hope that definition 38 is strictly more exclusive
than Sober’s definition, and thus not trivial, for the use of honest auxiliary sentences blocks
the trivialization arguments given above. This is because in the arguments, ¬P ∨O and
¬P ∨Q are justified by O and Q, respectively. If O or, respectively, Q are included in Π, Π
alone entails O.
I have not shown that reinterpreting Π as an honest set of auxiliary sentences leads
to non-trivial criteria of significance, and the triviality of Sober’s criterion might suggest
that the new criteria will suffer the same fate as Ayer’s. However, there are important
differences between Ayer’s criterion and the new ones. First, the criteria’s core ideas—
falsifiability, verifiability, and O -determinacy relative to a set Π—are not trivial. Therefore,
in the case of a trivialization proof, one can always fall back on falsifiability, verifiability,
or O -determinacy, and find a new restriction on the auxiliary sentences Π. (Without a
criterion of justification, empirical significance can be defined in a precise way only relative
to a set Π, and it has to be decided on a case-by-case basis whether Π is acceptable.)
Second, and in keeping with my criticism of recursive definitions of empirical significance,
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Π is not assumed to be determined by the criterion itself. This blocks trivialization proofs
that rely on recursive definitions. From these two differences follows a third: Problems
can only occur with the definition of ‘honest set’, and amendments of the criteria can
accordingly be restricted to this definition. In this sense, falsifiability, verifiability, and
O -determinacy are already good criteria of empirical significance. What is missing is a
good criterion of justification for sets of sentences.
Historically, the interpretations of Π have been varied. Przełe˛cki’s definitions explicitly
assume Π to contain all and only analytic sentences. Rynin seems to define his criterion
with analytic sentences in mind, and, as argued above, Ayer’s definition of direct verifiability
relies on analytic inferences, too. Lewis’s definitions rely on the concept of possible worlds,
and whether these are determined by analytic sentences is up for discussion. Suppes
is silent on the matter. Carnap (1936, 443), on the other hand, considers observation
sentences possible only if they are compatible with the laws of physics, that is, only if they
are not contravalid. And in another passage, Carnap (1935, 11) writes:
A proposition P which is not directly verifiable can only be verified by direct
verification of propositions deduced from P together with other already verified
propositions.
This is almost Ayer’s definition of indirect verifiability, except for one crucial difference:
The “other propositions” are not only required to be verifiable, but actually verified. Unlike
Ayer, Carnap does not define ‘verifiability’ recursively, but rather relative to a set of justified
propositions.15
Popper (1935, §3, emphasis changed) is very explicit about the role of justified sentences
in his conception of falsification:16
[T]here is the testing of the theory by way of empirical applications of the
conclusions which can be derived from it.
[ . . . ] With the help of other statements, previously accepted, certain singular
statements—which we may call ‘predictions’—are deduced from the theory
[ . . . ]. Next we seek a decision as regards these (and other) derived statements
by comparing them with the results of practical applications and experiments.
[I]f the decision is negative, or in other words, if the conclusions have been
falsified, then their falsification also falsifies the theory from which they were
logically deduced.
15Given the prediction criterion of confirmation, however, Carnap’s definition is still trivial: For any P and
any two O -sentences ω 6`ω′, where ω is true, {(P →ω′)∧ω} `ω and is thus verified by ω. Therefore, P is
indirectly verifiable.
16Lakatos (1974, 106f) also stresses that for Popper, falsifiability is relative to background assumptions, and
gives further references to Popper’s remarks on the topic.
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With the inclusion of previously accepted sentences in Π, the viability of Popper’s
criterion depends on the conception of acceptance, as do the viability of definition 38 and
Sober’s criterion. Indeed, apart from the specific restriction (iii) on auxiliary sentences,
Sober’s criterion is essentially Popper’s falsifiability criterion. But requirement (iii), if taken
to be the only restriction on the set of accepted sentences, trivializes Sober’s criterion.
Therefore it seems fair to say that Sober’s criterion, insofar as it is successful, is anticipated
by Popper.
In a review, Nott (1959) concludes about Popper’s dissolution of the problem of
induction:
One cannot help feeling that if [The Logic of Scientific Discovery] had been
translated as soon as it was originally published[,] philosophy in this country
might have been saved some detours. Professor Popper’s thesis has that quality
of greatness that, once seen, it appears simple and almost obvious.
This is the right conclusion, but the wrong thesis. It is doubtful that Popper’s dissolution of
the problem of induction is indeed simple and obvious (cf. Salmon 1967, §II.3). But the
preceding analysis suggests that if Popper’s falsifiability criterion, rather than Ayer’s, had
been the basis of further research into the problem of demarcation, philosophy might have
been saved the “sorry history of unintuitive and ineffective patches” (Lewis 1988b, §I) that
discredited the very idea of empirical significance.
10 Conclusion
I am now in a position to defend the title of this article. The belief that the search for
a criterion of empirical significance has been a failure is usually based on the problem
of past failures. I have given an alternative view on this search, mostly based on criteria
that have not been shown to be trivial. I have already argued that the criteria successfully
explicate their explicandum (§8.2), specifically with respect to their fruitful connection to
each other, comparative criteria of empirical significance, Ramsey sentences, and concepts
from measurement and definition theory. And because of the inferential relations between
the criteria, it is easy to see when an analysis or justification of one criterion transfers to
another.
The inferential relations also allow for a more informed search for generalizations of
the criteria. Two such generalizations, to general observational sentences and structures
and to general auxiliary sentences, have been developed in this article. My hope is that
the relations will also provide guidance in the search for criteria that can be applied to
probabilistic theories.
Thus a host of criteria, justified in a variety of ways, stand in strong inferential relations
to each other, fulfill the desiderata for explications, and have clear generalizations. For this
reason, I consider the search for criteria of empirical significance a success.
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A A generalization of Przełe˛cki’s definition of O -conservativeness
Definition 8 of semantic O -conservativeness is slightly more general than Przełe˛cki’s, who
suggests
Definition 39 (Przełe˛cki). A set Λ of V -sentences is semantically O -conservative with respect
to ∆ if and only if for each O -structure AO  ∆ there is a V -structure C  ∆ ∪ Λ with
C|O = AO .
Semi-formally, this can be paraphrased as
∀AO [AO ∆⇒∃C(C ∆∪Λ∧ C|O = AO )] , (4)
which is obviously restricted to observational sentences in ∆ due to ‘AO  ∆’ in the
antecedent of the implication. Equivalently,
∀AO [∃B(B|O ∆∧B|O = AO )⇒∃C(C ∆∪Λ∧ C|O = AO )] , (5)
but here the restriction ofB in ‘B|O ∆’ is gratuitous, and dropping it leads to definition 8.
B The relation of syntactic and semantic O -conservativeness
That syntactic O -conservativeness does not entail semantic O -conservativeness in first
order logic is known in model theory as the difference between elementary and pseudo-
elementary classes (Hodges 1993, §5.2). Elementary classes are simply those whose
members are models of a set Γ of first order sentences ({A | A  Γ }), while pseudo-
elementary classes are those whose members are reducts, to a fixed subvocabulary, of the
members of an elementary class ({A|O | A  Γ }). In light of claim 3, it is easy to see that a
set Λ is syntactically O -conservative if and only if {AO | AO Π|O } = {AO | AO  Λ∪Π|O },
where Π|O is the set of O -sentences entailed by Π, but semantically O -conservative if and
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only if {A|O | A Π} = {A|O | A  Λ∪Π}. Mal′tsev introduced pseudo-elementary classes
in 1941 (see Hodges 1993, 207, 260).
Przełe˛cki (1969, 52f) was possibly the first to mention this distinction in connection
with philosophy of science, specifically with respect to questions of concept formation
and the theory of definition. He does mention a proof, personally communicated by C. C.
Chang, that semantic O -creativity does not entail syntactic O -creativity.
Przełe˛cki and Wójcicki (1971, §1) reproduce a proof by Łos´ (1955):
Proof of claim 4. Let
AO := 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1〉 (6)
be the standard model of arithmetic and define ∆ := Th(AO ). ∆ is therefore complete.
Define T := {P} for the predicate symbol P and
α := P0∧∀x[P x → P x + 1]∧ ∃x¬P x . (7)
{α} ∪∆ is consistent, but there are models of ∆, for example AO , that cannot be expanded
to a model of {α} ∪∆.
The difference between syntactic and semantic O -creativity was first popularized in
the philosophy of science by Sneed (1971). Subsequent discussions were often phrased
in terms of the Ramsey-eliminability of theoretical terms (cf. Rynasiewicz 1983, §1; van
Benthem 1978).
With a reference to Przełe˛cki (1969), van Benthem (1982, §2.1.3) gives the following
proof with a more intuitive natural language interpretation:
Proof of claim 4. Let ∆ be a complete axiomatization of the theory of 0 and successor:
∆ := {¬∃x sx = 0,∀x∀y(sx = s y → x = y),∀x(x 6= 0→∃y x = s y)}∪
{¬∃x0∃x1∃x2 . . .∃xn−1∃xn(sx0 = x1 ∧ sx1 = x2 ∧ · · · ∧ sxn−1 = xn ∧ sxn = x0)}n∈N .
(8)
∆ can be understood as the theory that time proceeds without loops by a one-to-one
successor function s starting from 0. Define T := {≺, E} with a ‘before’ relation, an ‘early’
predicate, and a set of sentences stating the following: 0 is early, the successor of an early
time is also early, each time is earlier than some late (not early) time, and any time later
than a late time is itself late:
α := E0∧∀x(Ex → Esx)∧∀x∃y(x ≺ y ∧¬E y)∧∀x∀y(x ≺ y ∧¬Ex →¬E y) . (9)
Any finite subset of {α} ∪∆ has a model, and by compactness, {α} ∪∆ itself has a model.
However, 〈N, S, 0〉 is a model of ∆ that cannot be expanded to a model of {α} ∪∆.
The difference between semantic and syntactic falsifiability was recently again discussed
in connection with Ramsey sentences by Ketland (2004, 297f) and Demopoulos (2010,
§2).
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